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This Article argues that one cause of the current economic crisis was that
the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA) failed to provide mortgage
borrowers with the tools to determine whether they would be able to meet
their loan obligations, and that as a result many borrowers assumed loans
on which they would later default. The Article first explores the disclosures
for adjustable-rate mortgages-which were commonly used for subprime
loans-and explains how those disclosures misled borrowers about their
monthly payments. Next, the Article reports on a survey of mortgage
brokers conducted in July of 2009. The brokers were nearly unanimous in
reporting that borrowers never withdrew from a loan after reading the final
TILA disclosures at the closing and never used those disclosures for their
stated purpose of comparison shopping for loans. In addition, brokers
reported that many borrowers spent a minute or less with the disclosures,
despite the fact that mortgage loans are among the largest, longest-term,
and most complex obligations most consumers ever assume. It thus appears
that many borrowers enter into their mortgages without comprehending the
terms and the ramifications of those loans.
The Article suggests several measures to increase the likelihood that
borrowers will attend to and understand their loan terms. At present,
disclosures are mandated by governmental entities that do not participate
in the loan transaction-thereby reducing their control over how the
disclosures are presented; provided by lenders who do not have a stake in
having consumers understand the disclosures and in some cases have an
interest in obscuring them; and received by consumers who may not
appreciate their importance and may even have reasons to overlook them.
The Article therefore suggests a switch from the current TILA disclosure
regime to a comprehension regime under which lenders would be obliged to
insure that borrowers understand their loan terms. Alternatively, the Article
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suggests that lenders should be required to determine what proportion of
their borrowers understand their loan terms and disclose those figures with
the goal of generating competition among lenders for better comprehension
scores. The hope is that either choice would give a party to the loan
transaction-the lender-a stake in borrowers understanding their loan
terms. Creation of such an incentive might cause lenders to reduce
distractions to consumers reading disclosure forms, enlist the aid of lenders
in conveying key terms to consumers, increase the intelligibility of loan
terms, and lead lenders to abandon loan terms that consumers cannot
comprehend
If such a proposal proves politically unfeasible, the Article also draws on
the work of Cass Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler to suggest "nudges " that
might enhance the current disclosure regime. Specifically, the Article
advocates requiring borrowers to view a video of the pain and risk of
default and foreclosure to make those risks more salient and increase the
likelihood that consumers attend to disclosures. The Article also suggests
that loan applicants be obliged to draft a budget, taking into account any
future increases in loan payments, so that they will understand the
consequences of their payment obligations. Finally, the Article calls for
requiring borrowers to take a "placement exam " to demonstrate their
mastery of their loan terms and the budgetary consequences. Those who fail
the exam would not be permitted to borrow unless a neutral credit
counselor worked with them and certified that they understand their loan
terms.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The goal of this Article is to tell a story that goes like this: the economic
crisis that hit in 2008 had many causes, among which was the failure of the
Truth in Lending Act (TILA).' TWLA, intended to enable consumers to
borrow wisely, not only failed the subprime borrowers in that goal, but in
fact was interpreted to require lenders to provide misleading disclosures
which might have persuaded borrowers that their loans were more affordable
than they would turn out to be. Perhaps as a result, many borrowers seem to
have taken on loan obligations that were inappropriate for their
circumstances. Had borrowers better appreciated their loan terms, some
would not have assumed payment obligations they could not meet, fewer
borrowers would have defaulted, and the economic crisis might have been
less severe. The remainder of this introduction fleshes out this story, and the
balance of the Article substantiates the claims made in this introduction and
suggests changes in the law to address the problem.
In the years preceding the economic crisis, consumers entered into ill-
fated loans for many reasons. Some borrowers, who may actually have
understood their obligations, gambled that home prices would continue
rising, thus enabling them to repay their loans by selling at a profit or
refinancing at lower rates.2 Some may have been crooks, intending to
defraud lenders into making loans that would never be repaid.3 But others did
1 Truth in Lending Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (2006).
2 At least some subprime borrowers appear to have been speculators. See Todd J.
Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 U.
CoLo. L. REv. 1, 3 3-34 (2009) (Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data shows
that "since 2000 the percentage of subprime loans that are for non-owner-occupied home
loans-[i.e.,] to fund the purchase of rental or vacation homes ... has doubled from
about 8% of all subprime loans to over 16%" and suggests that many defaulters bought
for speculation).
3 See generally Carolyn Said, Mortgage Meltdown: Plenty of Blame for Lending
Mess, S.F. CH-RoN., Feb. 3, 2008, at C4 (No-documentation loans "were dubbed 'liar
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not understand their payment obligations and entered into loans that they did
not understand they could not repay, with dreadful consequences for
themselves, their families, communities, and the economy.4 Those
consequences include about 1.7 million foreclosures by June 30, 2009 in
nonprime loans originated from 2000 through 2007, or about 12% of those
loans.5 More than a quarter of the borrowers on those loans were seriously
delinquent, defined as either in foreclosure proceedings or at least ninety
days behind in payments, while less than two-thirds were current on their
payments. 6 Commentators have estimated the number of foreclosures in 2009
alone as 2.4 million,7 with as many as 13 million through 2014.8
As the economic crisis demonstrates, society as a whole has an interest in
insuring that loans are repaid. One check on whether consumers can repay a
loan is the consumer herself. But when consumers do not understand their
payment obligations, and so underestimate them, that check disappears. That
would matter less if lenders could predict with complete certainty which
consumers will default and so would deny loans to borrowers unlikely to
repay them. But the economic crisis makes clear that models for predicting
which consumers will default are not sufficiently reliable, or that some
lenders were willing to lend to those at significant risk of being unable to
repay their loans, or both.9 For example, in 2007, an official at one of the
loans' for a reason. Janitors claimed six-figure salaries and were able to buy half-million-
dollar homes."); MERLE SHARICK ET AL., MoRTG. ASSET RESEARCH INST., NINTH
PERIODIC MORTGAGE FRAUD CASE REPORT To MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION (Apr.
2007), available at
http://www.mortgagefraudblog.com/images/uploads/MBA9thCaseRpt.pdf.
4 See infra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
5 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-l0-146R, LOAN PERFORMANCE AND
NEGATIVE HOME EQurrY IN THE NONPRIME MORTGAGE MARKET 7 (2009) [hereinafter
GAO: LOAN PERFORMANCE], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dIO146r.pdf.
6 Id.
7 CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, SOARING SPILLOVER: ACCELERATING
FORECLOSURES To COST NEIGHBORS $502 BILLION IN 2009 ALONE; 69.5 MILLION HOMES
LOSE $7,200 ON AVERAGE 1 (May 2009) [hereinafter SOARING SPILLOVER], available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/soaring-spillover-
3-09.pdf.
8 See JAN HATZIUS & MICHAEL A. MARSCHOUN, GOLDMAN SACHS GLOBAL ECS
RESEARCH, HOME PRICES AND CREDIT LOSSES: PROJECTIONS AND POLICY OPTIONS 16
(Jan. 13, 2009), available at
http://media.garygreene.com/file.php/2 16/Global+Paper+No++1 77.pdf.
9 See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,526 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 226) ("The recent sharp rise in serious delinquencies on subprime mortgages
has made clear that originators were not adequately assessing repayment ability,
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nation's largest subprime mortgage lenders, Countrywide Financial,
testifying before a congressional committee about hybrid adjustable-rate
mortgages (ARMS) that carried an initial low rate but would later switch to
an adjustable rate, estimated that "about 60 percent of the people who do
qualify for the hybrid ARMS would not be able to qualify at the fully indexed
rate." 10 In other words, Countrywide anticipated that many borrowers would
particularly where mortgages were sold to the secondary market and the originator
retained little of the risk.").
10 Mortgage Market Turmoil:~ Causes and Consequences: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 1 10th Cong. 52 (2007) (testimony of
Sandor Samuels, Executive Managing Director, Countrywide Financial Corporation); see
also Public Hearing Before the Fed. Reserve Bd.: Building Sustainable Homeownership:
Responsible Lending and Informed Consumer Choice 121 (2006) (hearing before Fed.
Reserve Bank of Atlanta) [hereinafter Atlanta Public Hearing] (statement of Doug
Duncan, Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, Mortgage Bankers Association),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/events/publichearings/hoepa/20062006071 1I/
transcript.pdf ("[A] significant portion of loans are not underwritten at the fully indexed
rate."); Option One Mortg. Acceptance Corp., Prospectus, at S-5, S-50 (Apr. 29, 2005),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/l 025562/0000882377050011 35/d328276.txt
("In determining the ability of the applicant to repay the loan, a rate ... has been created
under the Option One Underwriting Guidelines that generally is equal to the lesser of the
fully indexed interest rate on the loan being applied for or one percent above the initial
interest rate on such loan.").
The fully indexed rate on many loans will exceed one percent above the initial
interest rate, and in fact the Prospectus also indicates that for one set of loans the
weighted average initial rate adjustment cap of the adjustable-rate mortgage loans was
2.988%, which obviously exceeds 1%. See id. at S-5; see also ILL. DEP'T FIN. AND
PROF'L REGULATION, FINDINGS FROM THE HB3 4050 PREDATORY LENDING DATABASE
PILOT PROGRAM 1 (2007), available at http-:/www.nlihc.org/doc/repositoryllL-
Findings.pdf (review of data collected by counseling agencies in Chicago in mandatory
counseling program found that "in the majority of cases [in which borrowers obtained
adjustable-rate loans] borrowers were being approved for financing solely on the basis of
the initial or 'teaser' rate, without regard to the borrower's ability to afford the loan when
the rate adjusted"); ELLEN SCHLOEMER ET AL., CmR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, LOSING
GROUND: FORECLOSURES IN THE SUEPRIME MARKET AND THEIR COST To HOMEOWNERS
5, 26 (Dec. 2006), http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-
analysis/foreclosure-paper-report-2-17.pdf ("Subprime lenders who market exploding
ARMs and other high-risk loans often do not adequately consider whether the
homeowner will be able to pay when the loan's interest rate resets, even if rates stay
constant.... Subprime lenders' public disclosures indicate that some are qualifying
borrowers at or near the initial start rate, even when it is clear from the terms of the loan
that the interest rate can rise significantly, giving the borrower a higher monthly
payment."); Paul Leonard & Michael Calhoun, Calculated Risk: Assessing
Nontraditional Mortgage Products, COMMUNITY INvEsmEN'rs 15, 15-16 (Dec. 2006),
available at http://www.frbsforg/publications/community/investments/0612/leonard.pdf.
But see U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-l1112T, ALTERNATIVE
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not be able to make their payments once the temporary teaser rates expired,
unless the borrowers' financial circumstances improved dramatically-
something which seems unlikely to happen to 60% of their hybrid ARM
borrowers-or interest rates were to fall substantially, another risky bet. No
doubt Countrywide anticipated that home prices would increase enough to
support refinancing, something that of course did not occur and that
hindsight makes clear could not have continued indefinitely."I Indeed, some
loans seemed virtually to invite default. Thus, a Countrywide manual
approved the making of loans that left consumers as little as $550 a month to
live on, or $ 1,000 for a family of four. 12
Under those circumstances, the ability of consumers to decline loans they
cannot repay becomes a key restraint on unwise lending.'13 In a sense, lending
decisions contain a built-in comparative advantage mechanism. Lenders are
able to predict which borrowers will default based on their extensive
experience with lending and their computer models, and that gives lenders
some advantages in predicting who will default. But borrowers know
something about themselves, their needs, their expectations, their spending
habits, and so on-giving them an advantage in predicting whether they can
MORTGAGE PRODUCTS: IMPACT ON DEFAULTS REMAINS UNCLEAR, BUT DISCLOSURE OF
RISKS To BORROWERS COULD BE IMPROVED 6 (2006) [hereinafter GAO: ALTERNATIVE
MORTGAGE PRODUCTS] (reporting that "0CC and Federal Reserve officials told us that
most lenders qualify payment-option ARM borrowers at fully indexed rates, not at
introductory interest rates, to help ensure that borrowers have financial resources to
manage future mortgage increases"). This contrasts with an example used earlier in the
GAO report, discussed infra notes 2 15-16, in which the GAO noted that a borrower's
payments would increase to an amount substantially higher than the monthly payment
used to qualify the borrower.
I For discussions of how some predicted that housing prices would fall and that
they were in a bubble, see JOSEPH E. STIGLiTz, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND
THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (Joseph E. Stiglitz ed., 20 10) (arguing that rise in
housing prices was unsustainable because median incomes were stagnant).
12 See Gretchen Morgenson, Inside the Countrywide Lending Spree, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 2007, at 9.
13 Cf Governor Edward M. Gramlich, Subprime Lending, Predatory Lending,
Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Community and Consumer Affairs
Dep't Conference on Predatory Lending (Dec. 6, 2000), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2000/20001 206.htm ("[Tihe best
defense against predatory lending is a thorough knowledge on the part of consumers of
their credit options and resources."); Valentina Hartarska et al., Credit Counseling and
the Incidence of Default on Housing Loans by Low-Income Households iii (The Ohio
State Univ. Rural Fin. Program, Working Paper No. 02P3, 2002), available at
http://aede.osu.edu/programs/ruralfinancePDF/20DocsPublications%/2OListPapers/02
P03 .pdf ("The evidence ... suggests that the ability to pay ... plays an important role in
determining the incidence of default.").
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meet loan obligations based on information not included in lenders'
computer models, perhaps because it is too expensive to ascertain. 14 As a
result, borrowers have some capacity to predict that they will not be able to
repay loans. But they cannot exercise that capacity if they do not understand
the loan terms well enough to measure them against their knowledge.
Accordingly, policy-makers should adopt rules that will ensure that
consumers understand their payment obligations well enough to permit them
to decline unwise loans. Existing law does not accomplish that for enough
borrowers. While the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act 15 (Dodd-Frank Act), signed into law on July 21, 2010, bars
lenders from making residential mortgage loans unless the creditor makes a
''reasonable and good faith determination'' that the borrower has a
"reasonable ability to repay [the loan] ,"-surely a step forward in addressing
this problem-the Dodd-Frank Act does not eliminate the borrower's
comparative advantage in determining some loan defaults and so cannot by
itself completely eliminate such defaults.' 6
This Article is based on three assumptions: first, that many consumers
will not deliberately assume loan obligations they know they will not be able
to discharge; second, that consumers need aid in determining loan terms and
why they should attend to them; and third, that it is possible to reconstruct
disclosure laws to provide that aid. The first assumption is obviously not true
of dishonest borrowers. In addition, some speculators may have been willing
to assume a substantial risk of default. But it appears likely that a significant
number of consumers would not have willingly set off down the path to
foreclosure if they had understood what they were binding themselves to do.
Of course, even if that assumption is wrong, disclosure laws are valuable for
other reasons, including those recognized in TWLA itself: they are intended to
help consumers choose among competing offers and at least theoretically
produce more efficient transactions.17 As a result, improving consumer
14 As discussed below, what borrowers know may sometimes lead them to excessive
optimism, and so this may not be a perfect restraint, though there may be ways to
counteract the optimism bias. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
15 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 13 76 (to be codified as *amended in scattered titles
and sections of the U.S. Code).
16 See Dodd-Frank Act § 1411, 124 Stat. 2142-43 (adding new section 129C to the
Truth in Lending Act).
17 TILA's purpose is stated at 15 U.S.C. § 1601:
The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be enhanced and the
competition among the various financial institutions and other firms engaged in the
extension of consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed use of credit.
The informed use of credit results from an awareness of the cost thereof by
consumers. It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of
20101 767
768 ~OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL [o.7:
comprehension of loan terms seems, all other things being equal, a worthy
goal.
Part 11 of the Article attempts to provide empirical support for the second
assumption and also to demonstrate that the laws in place during the years in
which the subprime loan buildup occurred did not provide the aid consumers
needed in making borrowing decisions. Part 11 opens by demonstrating how
existing disclosures are misleading. It then reports on a survey of mortgage
brokers that suggests that borrowers do not take account of federally-
mandated disclosures of their final loan terms in deciding whether to borrow,
and that many spend too little time with those disclosures to understand their
loan terms well enough to make appropriate decisions. Part 11 also relies on
existing scholarship to support the conclusion that law-makers must provide
borrowers more help if borrowers are to make optimal borrowing
decisions-the kinds that will keep them from assuming loan obligations on
which they will later default.
Part III discusses some strategies to test the third assumption.
Specifically, Part III suggests ways to increase the probability that consumers
contemplating borrowing substantial sums pay sufficient attention to and
understand their payment obligations well enough to make appropriate
judgments about whether they can meet those obligations. It first suggests a
reform that is unlikely to be adopted but that offers a better solution to the
problem than the current disclosure regime. Specifically, the Article suggests
switching to a comprehension regime, in which lenders would be obliged to
demonstrate that a certain percentage of their borrowers understood their
loan terms, and which gives lenders some flexibility in determining how to
convey those terms. Such a regime has the benefit of changing the incentives
lenders face from one in which they are largely indifferent to whether
consumers make appropriate borrowing decisions-as long as the lenders can
demonstrate that they have made the required disclosures-to one in which
lenders have an incentive to insure that borrowers actually comprehend loan
terms, which should enable consumers to make appropriate decisions. It also
enables consumers to benefit from the power of lenders to convey
information to consumers-something at which lenders have considerable
skill, as their advertising campaigns indicate-as opposed to the current
regime, which depends on governmental agencies which are not themselves
credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various
credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit...
Commentators have identified many other goals for TILA. For a list of thirty-eight such
goals, see Thomas A. Durkin & Gregory Elliehausen, Disclosure as a Consumer
Protection, in THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON CONSUMER CREDIT 114 (Thomas A.
Durkin & Michael E. Staten eds., 2002).
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involved in the lending transactions to figure out how lenders should best
communicate loan terms to consumers.
On the assumption that converting to a comprehension regime is
politically impossible, Part III next explores some strategies that would
increase the likelihood that disclosures benefit consumers. First, the Article
draws on Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein's book Nudge' 8 to suggest
that consumers need a "nudge" to read loan disclosure forms; for example, a
short video that would bring home to consumers the pain caused by
foreclosure might encourage them to read the forms. Second, the Article
suggests that consumers be tested on their comprehension of their loan terms.
Those who demonstrate comprehension can then proceed to closing,
assumning'that they still wish to do so. Those who fail the test will be barred
from borrowing until a disinterested loan counselor-not a mortgage
broker--certifies that the would-be borrower understands the loan terms. Part
III then justifies this paternalistic approach to lending regulation and explains
why it is preferable to the current disclosure regime.
11. THE TILA DISCLOSURES MISLED BORROWERS AND DID NOT GIVE
BORROWERS THE TOOLS THEY NEEDED To KEEP FROM BORROWING
UNWISELY
A. The Loan Terms Themselves
TWLA was inspired in part by a view that consumers needed aid in
understanding loan terms to make optimal borrowing decisions.' 9 The
reasons for this position became, if anything, stronger in the decades after
TILA's enactment, as loan terms became even more complex, with, for
example, such innovations as ARMS and payment option ARMs. 20 Consider,
for example, the following term, taken from a note for a 2004 "2/28 loan" -a
18 RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SuNsTEiN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
19 See supra note 17.
20 Adjustable-rate loans are loans in which the interest rate, and consequently the
monthly payments, shift from time to time. Vincent DiLorenzo, Mortgage Market
Deregulation and Moral Hazard.- Equity Stripping Under Sanction of Law 38 (St. John's
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-0179, 2009), available at
http://ssmn.com/abstract-1488293 ("In payment option loans the borrower can choose to
pay a minimum payment which does not include all accrued interest and does not include
payment of principal.... The accrued and unpaid interest is then added to the principal.
However, when the outstanding balance reaches a certain threshold-typically 115% of
fair market value [of the mortgaged property]-then the payment option expires and the
loan is recast to require monthly payments of both interest and principal.").
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common type of subprime loan, under which borrowers pay a low "teaser"
rate for the first two years, after which the loan becomes adjustable for the
remaining 28 years, often with an adjustment every six months. 2 '
4. INTEREST RATE AND MONTHLY PAYMENT CHANGES
(A) Change Dates
The interest rate I will pay may change on the first day of June, 2006,
and on that day every sixth month [sic] thereafter. Each date on which my
interest rate could change is called a "Change Date."
(B) The Index
Beginning with the first Change Date, my interest rate will be based on
an Index. The "Index" is the average of interbank offered rates for six-
month U.S. dollar-denominated deposits in the London market ("LIBOR"),
as published in The Wall Street Journal. The most recent Index figure
available as of the date 45 days before the Change Date is called the
"Current Index."
If at any point in time the Index is no longer available, the Note Holder
will choose a new index that is based upon comparable information. The
Note Holder will give me notice of this choice.
(C) Calculation of Changes
Before each Change date, the Note Holder will calculate my new
interest rate by adding six percentage point(s) (6.000%) to the Current
Index. The Note Holder will then round the result of this addition to the
nearest one-eight [sic] of one percent (0. 125%). Subject to the limits stated
in Section 4(D) below, this rounded amount will be my new interest rate
until the next Change Date. The Note Holder will then determine the
amount of the monthly payment that would be sufficient to repay the unpaid
21 See Preserving the American Dream: Predatory Lending Practices and Home
Foreclosures: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, I110th
Cong. 102 (2008) (statement of Hilary Shelton, Director, NAACP Washington Bureau)
("[O]ver 80% of home loans made in the subprime market today are adjustable rate
mortgage (ARMs) loans and the so-called '2/28' or '3/27' mortgages are the dominant
product."); GAO: LOAN PERFORMANCE. supra note 5, at 5 n. 10 ("[Slhort-term hybrid
ARMs [which would include a 2/28 loan] represented about 70 percent of the subprime
mortgages originated from 2000 through 2007."); Christopher Mayer et al., The Rise in
Mortgage Defaults, 23 J. EcoN. PERSP. 27, 30 (2009) ("The overwhelming majority-
over 75 percent--of subprime mortgages that originated over the 2003-2007 period were
so-called 'short-term hybrids'.) Mara Lee, Subprime Mortgages: A Primer, NPR
(Mar. 23, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=9085408 ("The
vast majority [of subprime loans]-about 80 percent-have adjustable-rate mortgages, or
ARMs, says Susan Wachter, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton
School who specializes in real estate."). According to the Federal Reserve,
"[ajpproximately three-quarters of securitized originations in subprime pools from 2003
to 2007 were 2-28 or 3-27 ARMs ... "Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,540 (July 30,
2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
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principal that I am expected to owe at the Change Date in full on the
Maturity Date at my new interest rate in substantially equal payments. The
result of this calculation will be the new amount of my monthly payment.
(D) Limits on Interest Rate Changes
The Interest rate I am required to pay at the first Change Date will not
be greater than 8.300% or less than 6.300%. Thereafter, my interest rate
will never be increased or decreased on any single Change Date by more
than One percentage point(s) (1.000%) from the rate of interest I have been
paying for the preceding six months. My interest rate will never be greater
than 12.300% or less than 6.300%.
(E) Effective Date of Change
My new interest rate will become effective on each Change Date. I will
pay the amount of my new monthly payment beginning on the first monthly
payment date after the Change Date until the amount of my monthly
payment changes again.
(F) Notice of Changes
The Note Holder will deliver or mail to me a notice of any changes in
my interest rate and the amount of my monthly payment before the effective
date of any change. The notice will include information required by law to
be given me and also the title and telephone number of a person who will
answer any question I may have regarding the notice.22
It is not clear how many borrowers actually read such terms, much less
understand them, especially since borrowers might see them for the first time
at the closing, when they are also confronted with numerous other legal
documents, and perhaps urgings from others present to sign the documents as
quickly as possible. But borrowers-and readers of this Article-who
struggled through that language may be dismayed to learn that it is often
superseded by an adjustable-rate rider appended to the note, which provides
still another term for calculating the monthly payments. 23 Whatever the
number of borrowers who read the original term, probably even fewer then
proceeded to read through the adjustable-rate rider. No doubt some
borrowers found it unnecessary to read either term on the theory that the
TILA disclosures made doing so unnecessary. But as will be discussed
22 Adjustable Rate Note (on file with author). For an example of a case quoting a
note using some of this language, see Leisy v. First E. Corp., No. 3:91 CV305, 1991 WL
1179813, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 1991); see also Complaint for Rescission of Mortgage
and Damages at 31-35, Frazile v. EMC Mortg. Corp., No. l:09-cv-21636-AJ (S.D. Fla.
June 15, 2009) (note appended to complaint).
23 For an example of cases involving a note including such a rider, see Frazile v.
EMC Mortg. Corp., No. 09-15560, 2010 WL 2331429 (11th Cir. June 11, 2010);
O'Donnell v. Bank of Am., No. C-07-04500 RMW, 2009 WL 765670 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
20, 2009).
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below, those disclosures are misleading, and in any event, many borrowers
gave them little attention.
B. The TILA Disclosures
Most subprime loans carry adjustable rates, and so this section explains
the mandated disclosures for adjustable-rate loans.24 Because by definition,
adjustable mortgage loan rates and monthly payments vary from time to time
with fluctuations in interest rates, it is impossible for the disclosure forms
provided at the closing to state what the payments will be once the loan
reaches the first date when the rates and payment amounts change. The
Federal Reserve Board, which was charged with interpreting and
implementing TILA, therefore came up with a three-step approach for
dealing with these products.25 First, lenders were obliged to provide two sets
of documents to consumers contemplating taking out an adjustable-rate loan
("the early disclosures"). The first of these was a booklet published by the
government called the "Consumer Handbook on Adjustable-Rate
Mortgages," commonly called the CHARM booklet.26 The second early
disclosure is a set of materials about any program into which consumers
inquire. The Federal Reserve's Model Form for these program disclosures for
variable loan clauses appears in Figure One. The program disclosures, as in
Figure One, may include a historical example of how payments shift over
time.27 In addition, in some cases, within three days after the borrower
submitted a loan application, originators were obliged to supply good faith
estimates (GFEs) of loan terms.28 Finally, mortgage originators were
required to provide the final set of disclosures by the time of consummation;
that is, before the papers were signed and the loan was agreed to.29
24 See supra note 20 for further discussion of adjustable-rate loans.
25 On July 21, 2010, the President signed into law the Dodd-Frank Act. Section
1061(b) of the statute transfers the Federal Reserve's consumer financial protection
functions, which includes responsibility for TILA, to the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB), to be housed within, but largely independent of, the Federal Reserve.
Dodd-Frank Act § 106 1 (b), 124 Stat. 2036.
26 The CHARM booklet is available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/arms-
arms english.htm.
27 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.19 (2010).
28 At the time many subprime loans were taken out, lenders were not required to
provide such GFEs for refinancings, only for loans used to purchase homes. The Fed has
since amended § 226.19 to extend the disclosure requirements to refinancings as well.
See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,590 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
226).
29 See 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.2(a)(13), 226.17(b) (2010).
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Unfortunately, the early disclosures were of oniy limited value to borrowers,
and the final disclosures were outright misleading. 30
Why were the early disclosures of only limited value? The utility of the
CHARM booklet is perhaps best explained by noting that the Federal
Reserve has proposed that lenders should no longer be required to supply it
to borrowers. 3' As for the early program disclosures, and as Figure One
indicates, the form has at least two defects from the point of view of someone
attempting to determine what their payment obligations will be.32 First, the
form need not state the actual figures for the borrower's loan. Thus, the
model form ungrammatically notes, "This is a margin we have used recently,
your margin may be different." As a result, borrowers attempting to
determine what their monthly payments will be cannot rely on the numbers
provided in the form.33 Second, the form is based on a $10,000 loan, rather
than on the actual amount the consumer intends to borrow. Of course, few, if
any, mortgage loans are for $ 10,000. While the form includes instructions on
how to multiply and divide to convert the $10,000 amount financed to the
consumer's mortgage amount, it is not clear how many borrowers go through
that exercise, or, for that matter, how many can,34 or that they regard the
information in the form as useful given that their own loan terms may vary.
In short, the early disclosures do not give borrowers the information they
need to determine if they can afford the monthly payments. Thus, the early
disclosures did not prevent a practice observed by the Federal Reserve in
2008: "In some cases, originators mislead borrowers into entering into
30 Originators are also required to supply certain disclosures pertaining to settlement
costs under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.
(2006), implemented by Regulation X, 24 C.F.R. pt. 3500. These disclosures include
good faith estimates provided within three days of the borrower's application and final
disclosures, now provided three days before closing, but at the time of the subprime run-
up, the final disclosures, known as the HUD- 1, could be provided at the closing. For
illustrations of the current RESPA forms, see 24 C.F.R. pt. 3500, App. A.
31 See Truth in Lending, 74 Fed. Reg. 43,434 (proposed Aug. 26, 2009) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226). The Federal Reserve has, however, stated that it will
continue to publish the CHARM booklet. See id.
32 The form appears in 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, App. H.
33 Many borrowers appear not to realize this. According to ICF Macro, a "large
number [of participants in focus groups and interviews] misinterpreted the historical
example table in the disclosure; for example, some thought that the historical rates shown
in the table would apply to their loan in the future." ICF MACRO, SUMMARY OF FINDINGS:
DESIGN AND TESTING OF TRUTH IN LENDING DISCLOSURES FOR CLOSED-END MORTGAGES
vii (July 16, 2009) [hereinafter LCF MACRO REPORT], available at
http://www.federalreserve.govfboarddocs/meetings/2009/20090723/Fu11 /20Macro%/20C
E%20Report.pdf, (report submitted to Fed. Reserve Bd.).
34 See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
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unaffordable loans by understating the payment before closing and disclosing
the true payment only at closing ('bait and switch')."135
But if the early disclosures are insufficiently helpful, the final disclosure
is outright misleading. Because of the inability to tell at the time of closing
how rates will shift in the future, the Fed's Commentary directs originators to
assume that interest rates at the time of future change dates will be identical
to the rates at the time the transaction closes.36 To understand just how this
command can deceive borrowers, consider the disclosure form for a "2/28
loan" shown in Figure Two. The disclosure statement correctly indicates that
the monthly payment for the first two years-when the teaser rate applies-is
stable. After two years, under the note, the rate and monthly payment can
shift every six months. But the disclosure statement shows that the monthly
payment will change only once-at the two year point-and then remain the
same for the remaining twenty-eight years, because, again, the lender is to
assume that rates do not change for those twenty-eight years. 37 Of course,
rates change frequently-which is one reason lenders find it desirable to use
adjustable-rate loans, because it imposes the risk of rate changes on
borrowers-and it is inconceivable that rates will remain the same for
twenty-eight years. Accordingly, borrowers who read such disclosure
statements may be misled into thinking that their payment obligations will be
more stable than they are.
But that problem pales beside the fact that the disclosure statement states
a monthly payment for the last twenty-eight years that may be substantially
35 Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,542 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pt. 226). For more on the program disclosures, see ICF MACRO REPORT, supra note 33, at
17 ("None of the participants [in focus groups or interviews], including those who had
recently shopped for an ARM, remembered ever receiving anything similar to the ARM
loan program disclosure they were shown.... Participants overwhelmingly indicated
they would not find the program disclosure useful and that if given the form, they would
probably not read it.... Upon looking at the form, the first reaction of many participants
was one of confusion. Several complained that it was very difficult to read due to the
terminology that was used.").
36 See 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 Supplement I, cmt. 226.17(c)(1)-8 (2010) (commentary on
TILA):
8. Basis of disclosures in variable-rate transactions. The disclosures for a
variable rate transaction must be given for the full term of the transaction and must
be based on the terms in effect at the time of consummation. Creditors should base
the disclosures only on the initial rate and should not assume that this rate will
increase. For example, in a loan with an initial rate of 10 percent and a 5 percentage
points rate cap, creditors should base the disclosures on the initial rate and should
not assume that this rate will increase 5 percentage points.
37 The form shows a slightly different payment for the final payment because of the
amount of the principal due at that time.
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less than the actual monthly payment required.38 That is especially likely to
be true if rates are low when the borrower takes out the loan. To make
matters worse, the monthly payment is one of the two most important factors
for borrowers in shopping among loans. 39 And, unlike the early program
disclosure, the final TWLA disclosure does not carry a warning that the actual
numbers may vary from those reported. 40 This played into the hands of
originators who wished to present loans as affordable.4 ' Oren Bar-Gill and
Elizabeth Warren have charged that such lenders "manipulate their product
design to present a low monthly payment."142 But in fact the lenders need not
do so, because the Fed's Commentary did it for them. 43
In short, the disclosure form is worse than useless for borrowers.44 It
provides a governmentally-mandated bait and switch: the bait consists of
38 The same is also true for other numbers on the disclosure form that depend on
interest rates, including the finance charge and the APR.
39 See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 54 n. 154 (2008) ("To many consumers, the single most salient feature of the loan is the
monthly payment."); ICF MACRO REPORT, supra note 33, at iv ("Interest rate and
monthly payment were by far the two most common terms that focus group and interview
participants compared between lenders or brokers when shopping.").
40 This problem was partly addressed by the Mortgage Disclosure Improvement Act
of 2008 (MDLA), Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2855 (to be codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1638(b)(2), and codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(a) (West 2010), 12
U.S.C.A. §§ 24, 338(a) (West 2010)), which will require lenders to provide a "worst-
case" scenario showing what the payments would be if interest rates went to the highest
amount permitted under the note. MDIA, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2857. But that
provision will not take effect until the earlier of the date upon which the Fed promulgates
implementing regulations, or thirty months after July 30, 2008, the enactment date of the
MDIA. See id The Federal Reserve has proposed such amendments. See Truth in
Lending, 74 Fed. Reg. 43,232 (proposed Aug. 26, 2009) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
226).
41 See infra notes 126-43 and accompanying text.
42 13ar-Gill & Warren, supra note 3 9, at 54 n. 154.
43 The problem was not limited to 2/28 loans, but in fact applied to any adjustable
loan, I addition, borrowers found the disclosures confising. See ICF MACRO REPORT,
supra note 33, at v, 16 ("Participants [in focus groups and interviews] were generally
confused by the payment schedule shown on the current TILA statement. For example, in
examining a TILA statement for a hybrid ARM, several participants incorrectly assumed
that the fact that payments in the table varied over time meant that they already reflected
future changes in interest rates. ... Testing clearly showed that the current TILA
payment schedule is ineffective at communicating to consumers what could happen to
their payments.").
44 Cf RICHARD BITNER, CONFESSIONS OF A SUBPIME LENDER 133 (2008) ("The
government, for all its efforts in [mortgage lending], has done more to create confusion
than to protect the consumer."); Federal Trade Commission, Federal Trade Commission
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false numbers on which borrowers may rely in determining whether the loan
is affordable, while the switch is to the actual payment obligations, which
borrowers may not be able to meet.45 That surely contributed to the fact that
42% of the short-term subprime hybrid ARMS were at least ninety days
delinquent or in foreclosure proceedings by June 30, 2009.46 Ironically,
borrowers wishing to know their payment obligations would have done better
to try to read the note setting forth their original obligations than to read the
disclosure form.
Empirical testing of TILA disclosures has also found them unhelpful to
consumers. Thus, a 2007 study by the Federal Trade Commission found that
many borrowers were not able to determine their loan terms or the cost of
their loans from the disclosures in use at the time of the study.47 Many
Workshop: Consumer Information and the Mortgage Market 133 (May 29, 2008)
(unpublished conference transcript) [hereinafter FTC Workshop] (statement of Janis
Pappalardo), available at http://www.ftc.govlbe/workshops/mortgage/transcript.pdf
("[W]e think that the ineffectiveness of the current federally required disclosures is likely
to have contributed, at least somewhat, to the current problems in the mortgage market.").
45 For other harms, see Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 39, at 63, observing that
"with imperfect information and imperfect rationality, credit may seem less costly than it
really is. Accordingly, more consumers will want to borrow. The economy will respond
by shifting resources to meet this increased demand-a shift that, given the mistakes
underlying the increased demand, leads to allocative inefficiency (since there are better
uses for these resources."
46 GAO: LOAN PERFORMANCE, supra note 5, at 8. That compares to a figure of only
16% for fixed-rate mortgages. Id
4 7 JAM~ES M. LAcKo & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, STAFF REPORT, IMPROVING CONSUMER MORTGAGE
DISCLOSURES: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT AND PROTOTYPE MORTGAGE
DISCLOSURE FORMS, at ES-6, 11 (2007), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/06fPO25505MortgageDisclosureReport.pdf ("[Iln-depth
consumer interviews [of 36 consumers] found that many borrowers were confused by the
current mortgage cost disclosures and did not understand key terms in the disclosure
forms, such as the APR, amount financed, and discount fees. Many borrowers also did
not understand important costs and terms of their own recently obtained mortgages.
Many had loans that were significantly more costly than they believed, or contained
significant restrictions, such as prepayment penalties, of which they were unaware....
[C]urrent mortgage disclosures fail to convey key mortgage costs to many consumers.")
The quantitative portion of the study also supported this conclusion. See id at 69-119;
see also IRA J. GOLDSTEIN, THE REINVESTMENT FUND, LOST VALUES: A STUDY OF
PREDATORY LENDING IN PHILADELPHIA 17 (2007), available at
http://trfuind.com/resource/downloads/Policypubs/lost -values.pdf ("Several borrowers
interviewed .. , reported having no knowledge that the loan they obtained was secured by
their home and that they could lose their home if they were unable to keep up with the
loan payments. They also reported thinking that they have one loan when they have
two.").
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consumers were confused about loan terms that bore directly on their ability
to repay their loans.48 The study .authors noted that "even respondents who
understood that they had adjustable rates did not understand the potential
increases they could incur. Respondents generally did not know the
maximum possible interest rates that were allowed by their loans."49
48 LACKO & PAPPALARDO, supra note 47, at 61-67; see also MICHAEL S. BARR ET
AL., NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, BEHAVIORALLY INFORMED FINANCIAL SERVICES
REGULATION 8 (Oct. 2008), available at
http://www.newamerica.net/files/naf behavioral -v5.pdf ("Brokers and lenders offered
loans that looked much less expensive than they really were, because of low initial
monthly payments and hidden, costly features.").
49 LACKO & PAPPALARDO, supra note 47, at 28. As noted supra note 40, new
disclosure requirements are designed to address this problem, but as discussed below,
such written disclosures will still be inadequate for some borrowers. The Study
elaborated at page 122:
About a fifth of the respondents viewing the current disclosure forms could not
correctly identify the APR of the loan, the amount of cash due at closing, or the
monthly payment (including whether it included escrow for taxes and insurance).
Nearly a quarter could not identify the amount of settlement charges. About a third
could not identify the interest rate or which of two loans was less expensive, and a
third did not recognize that the loan included a large balloon payment or that the
loan amount included money borrowed to pay for settlement charges. Half could not
correctly identify the loan amount. Two-thirds did not recognize that they would be
charged a prepayment penalty if in two years they refinanced with another lender
(and a third did not even recognize that they "may" be charged such a penalty).
Three-quarters did not recognize that substantial charges for optional credit
insurance were included in the loan. Almost four-fifts did not know why the
interest rate and APR of a loan sometimes differ. And nearly nine-tenths could not
identify the total amount of up-front charges in the loan.
And at page 123, the authors commented that consumers "may become obligated for
payments they cannot afford, such as property taxes and homeowners' insurance that are
not included in the monthly payment, or a large balloon payment they failed to
recognize." See also State of the U.S. Economy and Implications for the Federal Budget:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Budget, 1 10th Cong. 21 n.3 (2007) (statement of
Peter Orszag, Congressional Budget Office Budget Director) ("Certain ARMs may have
been among the more difficult mortgages for first-time borrowers to understand. Many of
those mortgages made in recent years included teaser rates, which may have confused
some borrowers about the eventual size of their mortgage payments when their mortgage
rates were reset."); GAO: ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGE PRODUCTS, supra note 10, at 2
(stating among reasons borrowers may not understand risks of borrowing that "mortgage
disclosures can be unclearly written and may be hard to understand"). Probably some
borrowers anticipated that home prices would continue to rise, thereby making it possible
for them to refinance before their monthly payments soared, and so leading them to
believe that possible increases in monthly payments were not relevant. But the
disclosures were not sufficient to cause borrowers to take sufficient account of the
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Similarly, a study of borrowers in certain Chicago zip codes found that "the
overwhelming majority" of those who received adjustable-rate loans had
thought their loans were for fixed rates,50 while another study found that "a
sizeable number of adjustable-rate borrowers report that they do not know
the terms of their contracts."151
These empirical findings are echoed in anecdotal reports that indicate
that some borrowers entered into loans without understanding their terms.52
Indeed, even an economics reporter for the New York Times, who had written
possibility that prices would not rise. This is discussed more fully infra note 257 and
accompanying text.
50 ILL. DEP'r FIN. AND PROF'L REGULATION, supra note 10, at 3-4.
51 Brian Bucks & Karen Pence, Do Homeowners Know Their House Values and
Mortgage Terms? 2 (FEDS, Working Paper No. 2006-03, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=899 152.
52 See, e.g., Atlanta Public Hearing, supra note 10, at 201-02 (statement of Karen
Brown, Home Defense Program, Atlanta Legal Aid Society) (describing how borrower
with credit score considered prime was given adjustable-rate mortgage she thought was
fixed and payments increased to $215 while her monthly income was $541); Rick
Brundrett, How Mounting Loans Devastated 87-Year Old, COLUMBIA STATE (SC), Feb.
24, 2002, at Al, available at 2002 WLNR 1738496; Bob Herbert, Editorial, Lost in a
Flood of Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2007, at A 17 ("To this day Ms. Levey does not
understand what she and her husband of more than half a century had agreed to. The
terms might as well have been written in Sanskrit.... I heard the same story again and
again-decent people enticed, sometimes fraudulently, into loans they never understood
and couldn't afford."); Bob Herbert, Editorial, A Swarm of Swindlers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
20, 2007, at A23 ("[P]redatory lenders have ... pushed overpriced loans and outlandish
fees on hapless victims who didn't understand-and could not possibly have met-the
terms of the contracts they signed. ... A lawyer, William Spielberger, ... said [mortgage
originators] ... were fully aware that the two women did not know what they were
getting into."); Gretchen Morgenson, Looking for the Lenders' Little Helpers. N.Y.
TIMES, July 12, 2009, at BUI (borrowers allege that lender promised fixed-rate loan
when loan was actually adjustable, something borrowers did not discover until two years
later; initial monthly payments consumed 45% of borrowers' income and later rose); Lisa
Prevost, The Fallout of Subprime Loans, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/l5/realestate/l 5wczo.html?exl 13421 52000&en=5 150
2d66d5337e7d&ei=5088 ("A 'staggering number' of homeowners who are reaching out
to the Consumer Law Group, a law firm in Rocky Hill, Conn., for help in avoiding
foreclosure don't understand their loans' terms, said Daniel Blinn, managing attorney at
the firm."); Carolyn Said, Mortgage Meltdown: Plenty of Blame for Lending Mess, S.F.
CHRON., Feb. 3, 2008, at Cl ("Many home buyers say they were misled or didn't
understand the terms of their loans, particularly the 'exploding ARMs' that adjusted to
stratospheric rates after a low introductory period."); Carolyn Said, Living the American
Nightmare, S.F. CHRON., July 29, 2007, at AlI.
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articles about mortgages, took out a mortgage without comprehending his
loan terms.53
C. The Survey of Mortgage Brokers
In July 2009, in an effort to determine how borrowers use the TWLA
disclosures, I had my research assistant, Sabihul Alam, conduct a telephone
survey of mortgage brokers. Ultimately he spoke to 102 brokers, who
reported that they had collectively attended more than 58,125 closings.54 The
brokers were virtually unanimous in saying that borrowers never withdrew
from a loan after reading the final disclosures at the closing, and never used
those disclosures for their stated purpose of comparison shopping for loans.55
53 See Edmund L. Andrews, My Personal Credit Crisis, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 17,
2009, at 47, 50 ("The paperwork was so confusing that I was never exactly sure who was
paying what. I hazily understood that I was paying most of the fees, one way or another,
but I couldn't figure out how, and I couldn't see any better alternatives.").
54 The number of closings reported probably understates the actual number. Brokers
who did not initially answer the question were prompted "More than 100? More than
1000?" Probably some stated that they had attended more than 1,000, say, even though
the number may have been much larger.
During the pre-survey research stage, I spoke to a mortgage broker who reported
attending more than 50,000 closings [hereinafter, the 50,000 closing broker]. Because
that broker was not called as part of the survey, and was asked slightly different questions
from those posed in the survey, the broker's responses are not included in the survey
response, but are referred to in the footnotes when they are relevant.
55 Only one broker reported encountering customers who withdrew from the closing
and did not later proceed with the loan. The 50,000 closing broker shared the view that
borrowers did not use the TILA disclosure forms for comparison-shopping. These
findings are consistent with the report of ICF Macro of the findings it drew from its focus
groups:
Even among participants who shopped for mortgages, the shopping process
almost always ended at the point of loan application.... [Olnce a loan application
was completed and accepted, very few participants ever revisited the shopping
process and talked to other lenders--even after they learned that the loan they had
been offered had terms they did not like, or that the terms of the offer had
changed....
... The most frequent reason mentioned [for not withdrawing despite reservations]
was that they did not feel they had any options at that point in time-particularly in
the case of home purchase loans. In other cases, participants accepted loans because
they believed, or were advised by lenders, that they could easily refinance to better
terms in the near fuiture. Finally, several participants said they felt intimidated and
rushed during the closing process and as a result found it difficult to object or raise
questions.
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At the time of the survey, the only binding TIELA disclosures were provided
at the closing.56 In other words, reading or hearing the only disclosures
provided to consumers that contained their final loan terms did not ever
prompt consumers to back out of their loans-no matter what the terms
were. 57 Assuming that the experiences of these brokers were typical-which
may not have been true, including for reasons discussed below-it seems
clear that whatever benefit the disclosures conferred upon consumers, they
did not help consumers to recognize and withdraw from loans on which they
would later default.58
ICF MACRO REPORT, supra note 33, at iii-iv.
56 Effective July 30, 2009, lenders were obliged to furnish final disclosures no later
than three days before the closing if the final disclosures differed materially from the
good faith estimates. See Truth in Lending, 74 Fed. Reg. 23,289 (May 19, 2009) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) (amending 12 C.F.R. § 226.19).
57 See also Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,542 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 226) ("Borrowers who consider the disclosure may nonetheless feel
constrained to close the loan, for a number of reasons. They may already have paid
substantial fees and expect that more applications would require more fees. They may
have signed agreements to purchase a new house and sell the current house. Or they may
need to escape an overly burdensome payment on a current loan, or urgently need the
cash that the loan will provide for a household emergency.... Furthermore, many
consumers in the subprime market will accept loans knowing they may have difficulty
affording the payments because they reasonably believe a more affordable loan will not
be available to them.... [Llimited transparency of prices, products, and originator
incentives reduces a borrower's expected benefit from shopping further for a better
option. Moreover, taking more time to shop can be costly, especially for the borrower in a
financial pinch. Thus, borrowers often make a reasoned decision to accept unfavorable
terms.").
58 One broker who responded to the survey indicated that some borrowers had
rescinded loans after the closing, but not because of the TILA disclosures. A flaw in the
study was that it did not expressly ask about post-closing rescissions. Some borrowers
would have had a right to rescind under 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(1) (2010), which gives
borrowers a three-day right of rescission "[iln a credit transaction in which a security
interest is or will be retained or acquired in a consumer's principal dwelling . .. ." The
regulation excepts from this right certain refinancings as well as residential mortgage
transactions, defined as the mortgage used to acquire or construct the home. 12 C.F.R.
§§ 226.23(f)(l)-(2), 226.2(24) (2010). Thus, borrowers in some unknown number of the
loans would have had a right to rescind, but other borrowers would not have this right.
Consequently, it is possible that some borrowers completed the closing but rescinded
within the three-day cooling off period, because of the TILA disclosures. This possibility
seems unlikely, however, for several reasons. First, brokers might well have volunteered
information about rescissions had they occurred, as one broker did; the fact that other
brokers did not suggests that they were not aware of such rescissions. Second, consumers
rescinding after the closing face the extra burden of "'unwinding" the transaction, and so
it would be more likely that someone with reservations would withdraw from the closing
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The survey is less -helpfiul in explaining why consumers fail to use the
disclosures for the purpose of deciding whether the loan is suitable, though it
is possible to speculate. First, it is possible that the brokers who responded to
our questions were not typical of brokers generally, and in particular did not
include many brokers that originated the loans that later defaulted. For every
broker who answered our survey, nearly four declined.59 It makes intuitive
sense that brokers conscientious enough to answer survey questions would
also be scrupulous enough to avoid originating loans that carried a high risk
of default, and that brokers wht) would originate such loans would not
trouble themselves to answer survey questions from which they would derive
no great benefit. Conceivably, less altruistic brokers might not answer our
questions, might be less meticulous in dealing with their borrowers, and
might have some borrowers who withdraw upon seeing the disclosures at the
closing.
Second, though the survey was not designed to ask how many of the
borrowers were familiar with the disclosures before the closing, many of the
survey respondents volunteered that borrowers were already familiar with the
loan terms. Obviously, borrowers who knew the terms before coming to the
closing would not be surprised to learn the terms at the closing, and so could
not be expected to pull out at that point. It is possible to infer from these
reports that some brokers kept their borrowers apprised of the-loan terms,
again suggesting a level of care that exceeds that of some other brokers.
Borrowers who took out purchase mortgage loans or loans to construct
homes may also have learned of the loan terms from the required good faith
estimates; 60 to the extent that the estimated disclosures did not change before
the closing-Which can be true if a borrower "locks in" a rate-the borrower
will learn the final terms from the good faith estimates. But there is also
reason to believe that many customers were not familiar with the TWLA
disclosures before the closing. Some brokers noted that final terms
sometimes do deviate from the estimated terms.61 Significantly, many
than rescind later. Third, consumers often experience the "endowment effect," see infra
note 173 and accompanying text, and so face some psychological barriers to rescinding.
But it at least remains a theoretical possibility that some consumers did go through the
closing and later rescinded.
59 Because of a communication glitch, the number of brokers called was not
recorded until fourteen brokers had already been surveyed. To obtain the remaining
eighty-eight respondents, 390 were called, for a response rate of 22.6%.
60 At the time the survey was conducted, originators were not required to supply
consumers applying for refinancings with good faith estimates. The regulations have
since been amended, as discussed supra note 28.
6.1 See also Public Hearing Before the Fed Reserve Rd. Building Sustainable
Homeownership: Responsible Lending and Informed Consumer Choice 135 (hearing
7812010]
782 ~OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL [o.7:
brokers reported that borrowers often asked at the closing why the Annual
Percentage Rate (APR) disclosure was higher than the stated interest rate.
Many consumers apparently feared that they were being charged a higher
interest rate than they had expected. 62 Presumably, borrowers familiar with
the TELA APR disclosure from an earlier disclosure-or even from reading
the good faith estimate-would have asked that question when they first
encountered the APR and so would not need to ask it at the closing. Another
frequent source of questions at the closing was the "Total of Payments"
disclosure, which informs borrowers how much they will pay over the life of
the loan in interest and principal. This disclosure seemed to inspire a sort of
sticker shock; again, borrowers who were already familiar with the
disclosures should not have experienced shock at seeing the disclosures at the
closing.
Of course, borrowers may fail to use the disclosures for reasons that have
nothing to do with the brokers. They may already be committed,
psychologically or otherwise, to the loan by the time they see the disclosures,
before Fed. Reserve Bank of Philadelphia) (2006) [hereinafter Philadelphia Public
Hearing] (statement of Jack M. Guttentag, University of Pennsylvania Wharton School
of Business), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/events/Publichearings/hoepa/2006/20060609/transcript.pd
f ("[T]he prices in this market are volatile. They change every day."); Atlanta Public
Hearing, supra note 10, at 155 (statement of Patricia McCoy, University of Connecticut
School of Law) ("[Iun actual cases that I've looked at, the prices on subprime loans often
turned out to be a moving target. A lender or broker might have the customer apply for
one type of loan, price A, say a fixed rate loan; changed the loan during underwriting to
an adjustable rate mortgage, price B; and then finally change the loan at closing to
something different at price C, say an interest only mortgage."); Bob Tedeschi, New Law
May Cause Delays, N.Y. TtMES, Aug. 16, 2009, at RElO ("Borrowers can see their
interest rates change from the initially quoted rate for many reasons. If their credit score
was lower than they first thought, or if they are required to pay mortgage insurance on the
loan because their down payment money ran low, for instance, the rate can easily rise by
more than one-eighth of a point.").
For illustrations of how quickly mortgage rates change, visit THE MORTGAGE
PROFESSOR'S WEBSITE, www.mtgprofessor.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2010).
62 Cf ICF MACRO REPORT, supra note 33, at iv, v, 11I ("Several [participants in
focus groups and interviews] were confuised by the fact that the interest rate was not
included on the current TILA statement, or incorrectly assumed that the [APR] was the
interest rate.... The meaning of the APR was generally not understood by participants.
Almost all either assumed that this rate was the same as their interest rate, or understood
that the two terms were different but could not explain how... . Participants had various
misinterpretations of the APR, such as that it reflected how the rate would adjust in the
future, or that it was the maximum possible rate.").
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and so it is possible that nothing could make them pull out of the loan at that
point.63
Many of the brokers reported that they explained the disclosures to their
borrowers at the closing. This, again, suggests that the respondents were
more conscientious than some. Though the survey was not designed to find
out why brokers engaged in this behavior, it is possible to speculate. As
already noted, our respondents may simply have been biased towards more
meticulous brokers. But other explanations are possible. Some brokers stated
that they explained the disclosures because they were required to do so by
law, and so they thought they had no choice in the matter. In fact, federal law
does not so require.64 Some brokers reported that it was their firm's policy to
explain the disclosures, though of course that raises the question of why the
firms require such an explanation. A cynical explanation might be that
because consumers never withdraw from the closing after hearing the
disclosures, the brokers have nothing to lose (besides time) in walking
borrowers through the disclosures. An even more cynical explanation is that
by talking borrowers through the forms, the broker can spin the information
contained therein in a way to keep the borrower from withdrawing. For
example, to ameliorate the perceived sticker shock, brokers can point out the
Total of Payments disclosure, and then observe that it is relevant only to
those who intend to stay in their homes without refinancing for the full
mortgage term-often thirty years-something that few borrowers may
expect to do. Another possibility is that brokers have learned that borrowers
inquire about the difference between the APR and the interest rate if they are
not told, and they wish to forestall such questions.
The survey also asked what percentage of consumers spent more than a
minute reading the TWLA disclosures. As it became clear that many brokers
explained the disclosure to their customers, this question was broadened to
cover the situation in which the customer spent more than a minute with the
disclosures, either because the broker explained them for that period of time,
or because the borrower read them, or both. Of the 102 brokers surveyed,
fifty-three, or just over half, reported that less than 10% of their borrowers
spent more than a minute with the disclosures. An additional twenty stated
63 See Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle, 57 FLA. L. REv. 295,
352 (2005) (stating that on the day of the loan closing "a borrower has psychologically
committed herself to the loan"). As discussed infra note 177 and in the accompanying
text, Congress has moved the disclosure date forward to three days before the closing
takes place.
64 Cf Truth in Lending, 74 Fed. Reg. 23,289 (May 19, 2009) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 226) (requiring creditors "to make good faith estimates of the required
mortgage disclosures" and to either deliver these estimates or place them in the mail, but
nowhere requiring the creditor to explain the disclosures to the borrower).
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that between 10 and 29% of their customers devoted more than a minute to
the disclosures, meaning that more than two-thirds of the brokers reported
that less than 30% of their borrowers spent more than a minute with the
disclosures. 65
A minute to understand the disclosures-and it may be less than that66-
does not seem like very much time considering that mortgages are typically
the largest and longest-term obligation a consumer ever assumes.67 Because
consumers rarely shop for mortgages, they typically lack the experience
needed to make sense of loan terms.68 And mortgage terms are complex.
That is, after all, the reason Congress enacted TWLA in the first place. For
example, Oren Bar-Gill has noted that option ARMS offer four different
65 This is consistent with the Fed's comment that, "At the closing table, many
borrowers may not notice the disclosure of the payment amount or have time to consider
it because borrowers are typically provided with many documents to sign then." Truth in
Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,542 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226). The
50,000 closing broker, see supra note 54, reported that 90% of the time borrowers spend
far less than a minute on the TILA disclosures, and that half spend less than thirty
seconds on the form.
66 Compare the results reported in the text with GOLDSTEIN, supra note 47, at 16
("Borrowers report that their loan settlements occurred at their kitchen tables and took
little more than a few minutes.").
67 See also ICE MACRO REPORT, supra note 33, at iv, 10 ("Many [participants in
focus groups and interviews] commented that because they were shown so many papers
at closing they did not read any of them carefully-including their TILA and H1UD- 1
statements.... Participants who did recognize the TILA statement were asked whether
they had found the document useful when they received it previously. Most indicated that
they had not, either because they had not understood it or because they had not paid
attention to it at loan closing.").
68 See Philadelphia Public Hearing, supra note 61, at 164-65 (2006) (statement of
Loretta Abrams, Vice President of Consumer Affairs, HSBC North America). Ms.
Abrams noted that an HSBC survey had found the following:
78 percent of consumers, stated that they are not, at all, very knowledgeable about
how to take out a mortgage loan, they actually spend very little time reviewing
mortgage options.... 34 percent of consumers told us that they researched their
mortgage options for less than a week, and people spend months looking for just the
right home, and then they spend less than a week making sure they've got just the
right mortgage ....
Id; see also Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage
Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1128 (2009); REN S. ESSENE & WtLLiAm APGAR,
JOINT CmR. FOR Hous. STUD. OF HARVARD UNIV., UNDERSTANDING MORTGAGE MARKET
BEHAVIOR: CREATING GOOD MORTGAGE OPrIONS FOR ALL AMERICANS I11 (Apr. 25,
2007), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/nm07-
I mortgage market-behavior.pdf.
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options for each monthly payment-and that's only one loan term.6 9 Or
imagine how much time would be needed to explain to a borrower the 2/28
mortgage payment term quoted above. It seems improbable that consumers
unfamiliar with such transactions could comprehend the consequences of
such terms based on an explanation of a minute or less. Moreover, borrowers
may not focus on those terms at all. Instead, as already noted, it appears that
many brokers and customers devoted their time to discussing the discrepancy
between the APR and the interest rate, and the Total of Payments disclosure,
which merit attention, but are not the only disclosures that borrowers should
attend to.7 0
When combined with the erroneous disclosures, the survey produces
ironic results. It may not matter that the forms are misleading, because few
borrowers attend to them. And it may not matter that few borrowers attend to
them, because the forms are misleading. Indeed, because borrowers cannot
be misled by forms th 'ey ignore, borrowers who spend little time with their
TWLA disclosure forms may be better off than those who studied them
closely. And perhaps the cruelest irony is that the resources poured into
fashioning and providing the forms to borrowers for decades appear to have
69 Bar-Gill, supra note 68, at 1103. Bar-Gill continues:
[Tlhese payment options are not predetermined sums; nontrivial calculations are
necessary to figure out what the options are. Moreover, these contracts, while
allowing negative amortization, typically cap the level of permissible negative
amortization, recasting the loan-even before the end of the introductory period-if
this cap is reached.
Id
In O'Donnell v. Bank of America, the court described an option ARM in the
following terms:
The loan product has an initial low teaser interest rate with correspondingly low
initial payments. The interest begins to adjust approximately one month into the
loan. While the interest rates are adjusting on the loan, the scheduled payments,
which are set to correspond with the initial rate, are subject to a 7.5% annual
increase until the loan reaches a "Reamortization Date."
O'Donnell v. Bank of Am., No. C-07-04500 RMW, 2009 WL 765670, at *1I (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 20, 2009) (citations omitted).
70 The brokers' reports are consistent with surveys reported in Durkin &
Elliehausen, supra note 17, at 129. Those surveys conducted in 1977 (in that year, the
Survey of Consumer Finances), 1981 (in that and later years, the Survey of Consumers),
1994, and 1997, showed that, depending on the year, 27 to 34% of consumers strongly
disagreed with the statement that "Most People Read Their Truth-in-Lending Statements
Carefully," while 33 to 38% disagree somewhat with that statement. Id. at 123, 129; see
also EssENE_ & APGAR, supra note 68, at 45 (claiming that disclosure documents are often
signed without being understood).
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been largely wasted, and even worse than wasted, because it created the
illusion of consumer protection-just as it created the illusion of accurate
disclosures-where none existed.
In sum, it appears that TILA failed to help the subprime borrowers
understand the terms of the loans they were entering into at a useful time, and
the consequences those terms would have for them. This can be inferred first,
from the misleading nature of the forms themselves, and second, from two of
the survey responses: (1) that many borrowers spent so little time with the
disclosures despite their complexity; and (2) that borrowers never withdrew
from loans at the closing, even though many seemingly saw the final TWLA
disclosures for the first time at the closing-and learned for the first time at
the closing what those forms said their loan terms would be. It seems
inconceivable that nearly every consumer, upon learning the final loan terms
for the first time, concluded that they were satisfactory.
It is tempting to blame the borrowers themselves for their behavior. They
could, after all, withdraw from loans with unfortunate terms, and they could
insist on taking more time with the disclosures. The loans on which
consumers defaulted were all consensual transactions. But when we know
that borrowers behave in predictable ways that are not in their best interests,
are not in society's best interests, and that, as discussed below, unscrupulous
lenders take advantage of, blaming consumers as an excuse for not changing
the rules governing the transactions only permits the undesirable behavior to
continue.71 A better approach would find ways to forestall the undesirable
behavior while minimizing the costs of doing so. Part III discusses some
ways to accomplish that goal. But first, Part 11 continues exploring the
reasons why consumers may act unwisely.
D. Other Evidence that TILA Failed
Many have noted that consumers entered into loans without
understanding their terms.72 Thus a survey of various parties involved in
71 Indeed, if so many consumers are giving the disclosures too little attention to
make appropriate decisions, it could be argued that the reasonable consumer so behaves.
72 See generally State of the US. Economy and Implications for the Federal Budget:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Budget, I110th Cong. 13 (2007) (statement of Peter
Orszag, Congressional Budget Office Budget Director) ("The rise in defaults of subprime
mortgages may also reflect the fact that some borrowers lacked a complete understanding
of the complex terms of their mortgages and assumed mortgages that they would have
trouble repaying." (footnote omitted)); President's News Conference, 43 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 1060 (Aug. 9, 2007) ("We've had a lot of really hardworking Americans sign
up for loans, and the truth of the matter is they probably didn't fully understand what they
were signing up for."); Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,525-26 (July 30, 2008) (to be
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predatory lending in Philadelphia reported "settlement agents will readily
admit that borrowers, although signing numerous documents, generally have
no idea at all what they are getting into."173
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) ("Consumers who do not fully understand such terms and
features, however, are less able to appreciate their risks, which can be significant. For
example, the payment may increase sharply and a prepayment penalty may hinder the
consumer from refinancing to avoid the payment increase. Thus, consumers may
unwittingly accept loans that they will have difficulty repaying."); Kathleen C. Engel &
Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets. The Law and Economics of Predatory
Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1286 (2002) ("[T]he victims of predatory lenders sign
documents without having a clear sense of the terms of the contracts, how much they
borrowed, what they purchased, the terms of repayment, or the risks they assumed.");
Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The Truth, The Whole Truth, and Nothing But
the Truth: Fullling the Promise of Truth in Lending, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 181, 196
(2008) ("The lender-created complexity of mortgage loans now exceeds what most
consumers, even highly educated consumers, are capable of comprehending."); Zywicki
& Adamson, supra note 2, at 73 ("Mortgages, whether in the prime or subprime market,
are inherently complex products about which a consumer knows and can know little.
First-time homebuyers are generally overwhelmed at the complexity and amount of loan
documentation that accompanies a home purchase and the[ir] lack of opportunity to fully
read and ask questions about [their] mortgage terms. Having gone through the experience
once, second-time homebuyers rarely closely examine their loan documents. Nor is it
likely, even if they did take the time to examine their documents, as we have seen, that
average borrowers would be able to comprehend most of their terms."); BARR ET AL.,
supra note 48, at 8 ("While the causes of the mortgage crisis are myriad, a central
problem was that many borrowers took out loans that they did not understand and could
not afford."); ALLEN J. FiSHBEIN & PATRICK WOODALL, CONSUMER FED'N OF Am.,
EXOTIC OR Toxic? AN' EXAMINATION OF THE NON-TRADITIONAL MORTGAGE MARKET
FOR CONSUMERS AND LENDERS 20 (May 2006), available at
http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/file/housing/ExoticToxic
_MortgageReport05O6.pdf ("[M]ore vulnerable consumers-first time homebuyers,
unsophisticated financial consumers, and consumers traditionally underserved by the
mortgage market, especially lower-income and minority consumers . . . are less likely to
understand .. . the complexity of the mortgage vehicles they are offered-. .). Mortgage
industry insiders also acknowledge the point. See, e.g., Ending Mortgage Abuse:
Safeguarding Homebuyers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous., Transp. & Cmty.
Dev. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 110 th Cong. 112 (2007)
(testimony of Denise Leonard, Director, National Association of Mortgage Brokers)
("Current disclosures have failed to keep pace with market innovations. Consumers are
not being given the tools needed to effectively shop for a mortgage in a market that is
offering increasingly innovative and complex options."); Atlanta Public Hearing, supra
note 10, at 92 (statement of Ken Logan, Chairman-Elect, National Home Equity
Mortgage Association) ("[flew borrowers fully understand their residential transaction or
the disclosures."); BITNER, supra note 44, at 133 (former mortgage lender estimated that
half of mortgage borrowers did not understand "what they were doing").
73 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 47, at 16. The study also states: "[Ilf the borrowers had
access to full, complete and accurate information, they would never have entered into the
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Such claims also find support in evidence that some borrowers pay more
than other similarly-situated borrowers, which implies a market failure. Thus,
one study concluded that "younger adults and older adults borrow at higher
interest rates and pay more fees than middle-aged adults controlling for all
observable characteristics . .. ."74 Similarly, another study found that
"borrowers with a bachelor's degree pay their brokers $1,500 less than those
without, other things equal."175 Perhaps the most dramatic instance of this
effect comes from the ability of lenders to steer borrowers who could have
qualified for prime loans to higher-cost subprime loans. 76 Thus, Wells Fargo
transactions. Interviews with borrowers, lenders, attorneys representing both lenders and
borrowers and settlement agents reveal that a lack of information is a crucial aspect of the
transactions." Id. at 15-16.
74 Sumit Agarwal et al., The Age of Reason: Financial Decisions Over the Life-
Cycle with Implications for Regulation 3, 22, 23 (Oct. 19, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract--973790 ("[Flor home-equity lines of
credit, 75-year olds pay about $265 more each year than 50-year olds, and 25-year olds
pay about $295 more... . [M]iddle-aged adults borrow at lower interest rates and pay
fewer fees relative to younger and older adults.. .. The measured effects are not
explained by . .. age-dependent default risks."); see also id at 71, 74 (figures
demonstrating that the middle-aged borrowers in the authors' study had lower (worse)
FICO scores and higher default rates than the younger and older adults in the study).
75 Susan E. Woodward, Consumer Confusion in the Mortgage Market 1
(unpublished manuscript) (July 14, 2003) [hereinafter Woodward, Consumer Confusion],
available at www.sandhillecon.com/pdf/consumer -confusion.pdf. The author also found
that the borrower's race and broker's sex affect the broker's fee. Id. at 2; see also SUSAN
WOODWARD, A STUDY OF CLOSING COSTS FOR F1HA MORTGAGES ix, xiii (May 2008)
(report prepared for U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. Office of Pol'y Dev. & Research)
[hereinafter WOOD WARD, STUDY OF CLOSING COSTS], available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract -id=l 341045 ("African-American
borrowers pay an additional $415 for their loans after accounting for other borrower
differences and Latino borrowers pay an additional $365, on average.... On average,
borrowers who completed college are charged $1100 less than borrowers who did not go
to college at all, other things equal. . .. These variations suggest that markets are not fully
transparent or competitive.").
76 See Atlanta Public Hearing, supra note 10, at 37 (statement of Margot Saunders,
National Consumer Law Center) ("[Tlhe high price is obtained from borrowers from
whom they can be obtained from [sic) and the losses that result from those loans are used
as the justification for the high price. I have seen dozens and dozens of loans with very
high prices made to people who had very high credit ratings. I think those people were
just more vulnerable."); ILL. DEP'T FIN. AND PROF'L REGULATION, supra note 10, at 5
(study of Chicago borrowers finds that many of the borrowers could have qualified for "a
more affordable loan had they been better informed about what was available to them");
Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts:~ The Community Reinvestment Act and Its
Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 513, 556 (2005); Marsha J. Courchane et al., Subprime
Borrowers: Mortgage Transitions and Outcomes, 29 J. REAL ESTATE FIN. & ECON. 365,
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loan officers have reported in affidavits filed in a case brought by the City of
Baltimore against Wells Fargo that they persuaded loan applicants to settle
for subprime loans even though the applicants could have obtained lower-
cost loans.77 Wells Fargo's representatives were able to do so by telling
applicants, for example, that the subprime loans required less paperwork or
could be processed more quickly. Given the substantially greater costs of
subprime loans, which can amount to many thousands of dollars in higher
interest payments, such strategies could work only in a dysfunctional
market. 78 To see why this is so, imagine a grocery store that attempted to
persuade consumers to purchase milk at $30 a quart by promising reduced
paperwork or faster service. Such a store would not sell much milk. But in a
market in which consumers do not comparison-shop with the actual terms,
such as our survey indicates is true of the home lending market, consumers
are not able to discover that they can obtain financing at lower cost.7 9
381 (2004) ("Our results suggest that borrowers may inappropriately receive subprime
mortgages. .. ); Morgenson, supra note 12, at 9 (Countrywide's "incentive system also
encouraged brokers and sales representatives to move borrowers into the subprime
category, even if their financial position meant that they belonged higher up the loan
spectrum."); cf Howard Lax et al., Subprime Lending: An Investigation of Economic
Efficiency, 15 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 533, 566 (2004) ("More than two-fifths of
subprime borrowers do not think they got the mortgage that was best for them, nearly
nine times more than prime borrowers who express this kind of discontent.").
77 Declaration of Elizabeth M. Jacobson, Brief of Plaintiff Exhibit 2 at 3-4, City of
Balt. v. Wells Fargo, N.A., 677 F. Supp. 2d .847 (D. Md. 2010) (No. 1:08 CV 62)
[hereinafter Jacobson AffjJ; see also Declaration of Tony Paschal, Brief of Plaintiff
Exhibit 1 at 6, City of Balt. v. Wells Fargo, N.A., 677 F. Supp. 2d 847 (D. Md. 2010)
(No. 1:08 CV 62) [hereinafter Paschal Afft] ("I ... regularly saw minority customers who
had good credit scores and credit characteristics in subprime loans who should have
qualified for prime or [Fair Housing Act] loans.").
78 See EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, SUBPRIME MORTGAGES: AMERICA'S LATEST BOOM
AND BUST 19 (2007) ("[Ilt is complicated and confusing for borrowers to search out all
their available options, to understand all the terms of the loans, and to avoid getting
misallocated into a lower credit category than may be appropriate. In the end the process
by which rates are set is regulated by the borrower's ability to shop around, and
prospective borrowers may not know where to shop, what to ask, or how to evaluate their
own credit-worthiness." (citation omitted)).
79 Confusion about loan terms may also contribute to defaults. For example, the
added costs incurred by borrowers who end up with more expensive loans than they
might have qualified for may tip the loan over into being unaffordable, with the result
that the borrower defaults even though the borrower might have been able to meet her
payment obligations on a more appropriate loan. See Atlanta Public Hearing, supra note
10, at 15 (statement of Margot Saunders, National Consumer Law Center) ("The price
too often creates the risk."); see also LACKO & PAPPALARDo, supra note 47, at 123
("Consumers who do not recognize key loan costs can be harmed in a number of ways.
They may be unable to fully understand the cost of their loan, assess whether it is a good
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Still other evidence that consumers have not made wise decisions is
found in the number of borrowers who seem to have entered into loans
inappropriate for their situation.80 The federal Department of Housing and
Urban Development takes the position that a household's housing is
unaffordable if housing costs consume more than 30% of the household
income; housing is considered severely unaffordable if the housing absorbs
more than half the household's income.81 By that standard, in 2006, nearly a
third of U.S. households could not afford their housing, and more than a
tenth had severely unaffordable housing.82 It seems unlikely that so many
families assumed such obligations fully understanding the consequences, but
deal, ensure that the terms are appropriate to their circumstances, and compare loan offers
from different lenders. These consumers may pay more for their loans than necessary by
unknowingly accepting excessive settlement costs or charges for unwanted optional
products.... They may obtain loan terms that are inappropriate to their circumstances,
such as unknowingly accepting a prepayment penalty when they know they are likely to
refinance soon. And they may make inappropriate trade-offs between long- and short-
term costs (that is, between interest rates and points) or inappropriate selections of
alternative mortgage products (such as interest-only or payment option loans).").
80 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 47, at 68 ("What becomes clear in the course of
interviews with borrowers and industry people alike is that consumers often end up with
products that are not appropriate to their given circumstance. Either they do not
understand the product or do not have the financial wherewithal to deal with the
mortgage as its various features unfold over time.").
81 OFFICE OF POL'Y DEV. AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv.,
TRENDS IN WORST CASE NEEDS FOR HOUSING 1978-1999: A REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
WORST CASE HOUSING NEEDS 11 (2003), available at
http://www.huduser.org/publications/PDF/trends.pdf; Glossary of Terms to Affordable
Housing, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV.,
http://www.hud.gov/local/nv/library/archives/features/2006-04-06glos.cfm (last visited
Aug. 23, 2010); DANILO PELLETIERE ET AL., NAT'L Low INCOME Hous. COAL., WHO's
BEARING THE BURDEN? SEVERELY UNAFFORDABLE HOUSING: AN EXAMINATION OF
NATIONAL AND STATE AFFORDABLE HOUSING NEEDS FROM THE 2003 AMERICAN
COMMUNITY SURVEY (Aug. 2005), available at
http://www.nlihc.org/doc/bearingburden.pdf, see also Daniel A. Mica, Financial
Literacy--Yeah, Gimme Some of That, CREDIT UNION MAG., Jan. 2008, at 2A, 2A ("The
.. counselor's rule of thumb has long been that a consumer risks serious trouble when
total housing expense reaches 30% of gross income.").
8 2 JON CTR. FOR Hous. STUD. OF HARVARD UNWv., THE STATE OF THE NATION'S
HOUSING 2008 40 (2008), available at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2008/son2008.pdf-, see also Mica,
supra note 81, at 2A ("[M]ore than one-third of U.S. homeowners spend [30%] or more
[of their gross income] on housing. Worse, one of seven homeowners spends 50% or
more of pre-tax income on shelter.").
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then, our survey and the TILA forms themselves raise doubts about whether
they did.83
Similarly, as Oren Bar-Gill has observed, loans which provide for a low
initial interest rate followed by higher rates are designed for those who have
reason to expect a dramatic jump in their incomes, such as students who can
anticipate a lucrative career upon graduation. Yet the millions of borrowers
who took out such loans surely exceed the number of people who fit that
description 84
Additional evidence that borrowers did not understand their payment
obligations and their consequences can be found in the number of borrowers
who defaulted quickly on those obligations. Thus, studies have found that
"the age of subprime loans at foreclosure[] is generally 2 years or less
. . .. "985 At one prominent subprime lender, New Century Financial, the
percentage of borrowers who missed one of the first three payments hit 10%
in the third quarter of 2004 and rose as high as 16% in 2006.86 While some
early defaulters may have been crooks who never intended to repay loans,
and others speculators, and still others unfortunates who encountered a run of
bad luck, others seemingly did not understand their obligations or
overestimated their abilities to meet those obligations. 87
83 Probably some of these borrowers suffered financial reversals which reduced their
income, thereby placing them in these categories, but it is unlikely that most of them did.
84 Bar-Gill, supra note 68, at 1109.
85 HAROLD L. BUNCE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND UR-BAN DEv., SUBPRIME
FORECLOSURES: THE SMOKING GUN OF PREDATORY LENDING? 257, 268 (2001), available
at http://www.huduser.org/publications/Pdf/brd/12bunce.pdf-, see also Mayer et al., supra
note 21, at 37.
86 DAN IMMERGLUCK, FORECLOSED: HIGH-RiSK LENDING, DEREGULATION, AND THE
UNDERMINING OF AMERICA'S MORTGAGE MARKET 128-29 (2009).
87 While this finding, to some extent, undermines the significance of the misleading
nature of the TILA disclosures for 2/28 loans, because changes in the monthly payments
were less significant to borrowers who defaulted before reaching the first change date, it
does not render it without importance for several reasons. First, some borrowers did not
default until after the first change date. See Anthony Pennington-Cross & Giang Ho, The
Termination of Subprime Hybrid and Fixed Rate Mortgages 21-22, 34 (Fed. Reserve
Bank of St. Louis, Research Div., Working Paper No. 2006-042A, 2006), available at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2006/2006-042.pdf. Second, the 2/28 mortgage was only
one type of loan. Other loans provided for adjustment much earlier than the second year,
and so borrowers with such loans may have defaulted precisely because of unexpected
payment increases. See Press Release, Freddie Mac, Freddie Mac Releases Results of Its
23rd Annual ARM Survey -(Jan. 3, 2007), available at
http://www.freddiemac.com/news/archives/rates/2007/20070103_06anmsurvey.html.
Third, even some of those who defaulted before their payments increased might have
been dissuaded from taking out the loans if the disclosure forms had conveyed to them
the amounts to which their monthly payments could have risen, thereby helping them to
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E. Why has TILA Failed?
Why have the TWLA disclosures been so unhelpful? Some causes of the
problem may be structural. TWLA, in common with many disclosure statutes,
suffers from mandating a communication that the sender-the originator-
often does not have an interest in being received, and, in the case of
unscrupulous originators, may have an interest in obscuring or spinning in a
particular way, a point amplified upon below. Lenders who plan to retain the
loan have a stake in the borrower understanding the loan terms if the
borrower will first, prove unable to make the payments at some point, and
second, would so realize upon understanding the loan terms. But if the lender
plans both to make and retain the loan, the lender must expect that the
borrower will be able to make the loan payments. Consequently, the lender
may believe that it has little to gain if the borrower fully appreciates the loan
terms--especially since if the lender thinks the borrower can make the loan
terms, but the borrower withdraws from the closing anyway, the lender has
lost a sale. Originators who plan to sell loans to others have even less of a
stake in borrowers understanding loan terms. Because they will not retain the
loan, they do not bear the risk of a default. If the borrower pulls out of the
loan, such an originator loses a sale and has no offsetting reduction in risk.
Such an originator has nothing to gain by the borrower withdrawing from the
loan and much to lose. In short, often the people who must present the
disclosures may not perceive that they have anything to gain if borrowers
understand them. As a result, unscrupulous originators lack an interest in
eliminating distractions, providing clarifications, or learning from experience
how to improve the communication or fix the disclosures. Instead, that role is
left to government officials. But government suffers from inherent
disabilities in playing that role.
The TWLA disclosures are partly dictated by Congress, through TWLA
itself, and partly by the Federal Reserve Bank, which implements TWLA
through Regulation Z and the accompanying Commentary (though the
Federal Reserve's responsibility is to be shifted to the Consumer Financial
better understand the risk they were taking. Put differently, some borrowers upon seeing
their possible exposure once the monthly payments could shift, might have turned down
the loan, and so not have defaulted. Fourth, many borrowers continued making payments
after their monthly payments leaped to unexpected amounts, but those higher payments
may have placed great stress on their household budgets, and some may default in time.
See Mayer et al., supra note 21, at 37 ("Mortgage rate resets may yet cause difficulties
going forward: households trying to refinance hybrid short-term mortgages in 2008 and
later face an environment of stagnant to falling house prices and tightened underwriting
standards.").
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Protection Bureau).88 This two-headed arrangement has made the drafting of
effective disclosures difficult. Members of Congress have so many concerns
besides TWLA that they can only rarely afford TWLA the attention it requires,
while the leaders of the Fed have been chosen not for their expertise in
consumer protection, much less consumer disclosure regulation, but for their
knowledge of macroeconomics (quite rightly, in light of the important role
the Fed plays in managing the economy). It is, therefore, hardly surprising
that the original version of former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan's memoir, The
Age of Turbulence, almost completely overlooked TWLA, while including
entire chapters on each of China, Russia, and Latin America, areas of the
world for which the Fed has no formal responsibility. 89 Thus, Oren Bar-Gill
and Elizabeth Warren have commented that "The Federal Reserve does not
view consumer protection as its core mission."90 The result is that TWLA has
not received the attention it merits. That the Fed did not itself conduct a
survey of the type described herein and took twenty years to propose changes
in its misleading disclosures for adjustable-rate mortgages offers further
support for that proposition. Such concerns contributed to Congress's
decision to transfer the Federal Reserve's authority over TWLA to the new
CFPB.9 1
But TILA's failure cannot be attributed solely to the fact that it has been
administered by an agency devoted to monetary policy. The effectiveness of
disclosure itself has limits, as illustrated by a series of tests conducted by
Macro International for the Federal Reserve Board in 2008.92 Macro had
consumers read disclosures stating that mortgage brokers had an incentive to
arrange for loans with higher interest rates, because that would increase
broker compensation. 93 Macro's report of its finding stated:
88 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
89 ALAN GREENSPAN, THE AGE OF TURBULENCE 294-310, 323-45 (2007).
90 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 39, at 90 n.293; see also EDMUND ANDREWS,
BUSTED: LIFE INSIDE THE GREAT MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 79 (2009) (reporting that
Federal Reserve governors viewed the chairmanship of the Fed's consumer affairs
committee as "a backwater"); Heidi Mandanis Schooner, The Role of Central Banks in
Bank Supervision in the United States and the United Kingdom, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
411, 427 (2003) ("[Tjhe Federal Reserve's ... regulatory role remains focused on safety
and soundness and not on other goals of financial regulation. .. )
91 See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 2(3), 2(4), 1061(b)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 1387, 2036.
92 MACRO INTERNATIONAL, INC., CONSUMER TESTING OF MORTGAGE BROKER
DISCLOSU~RS i (July 10, 2008) (report submitted to Fed. Reserve Bd.) [hereinafter
MACRO INT'L], available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/200807 14regzconstest pdf.
93 Id at 1.
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Nearly all participants were surprised to read about the brokers'
conflict....
Shortly after reading the disclosure, about half of the participants made
statements that directly contradicted what they had read in the agreement
about broker incentives. Several, for example, stated late in their interviews
that they would expect the broker to show them the loans with the best
terms available. However, the disclosure they had just read specifically
pointed out that brokers would in fact have incentives not to do so.94
So Macro disclosed the conflict more explicitly. The following paragraph
describes the result:
As in [the earlier round], most participants understood upon their first
reading of the agreement that the broker would have a financial incentive to
provide them with higher-interest rate loans. Again, however, participants'
preconceived belief that brokers were working in the best interest of
borrowers made this conflict difficult to accept. As a result, many became
confused or reverted to their prior assumptions.9 5
And, Macro found, the revised disclosures led to other misconceptions. 9 6
In short, even under perfect conditions, when no one is attempting to distract
consumers from focusing on disclosures, deceive them, or rush them into a
particular transaction, disclosures may not be useful to consumers when they
create cognitive dissonance. As Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke has noted,
"4not even the best disclosures are always adequate.. .. [S]ome aspects of
increasingly complex products simply cannot be adequately understood or
evaluated by most consumers, not matter how clear the disclosure." 9 7
94 1Id. at 12. Others have noted that borrowers suffer from this misconception. See,
e.g., Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,525 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pt. 226) ("Anecodotal evidence indicates that consumers in both the prime and subprime
markets often believe, in error, that a mortgage broker is obligated to find the consumer
the best and most suitable loan terms available."); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 47, at 17
("Borrowers say they believed, albeit incorrectly . .. that the broker they hired
represented their best interests."); cf WOODWARD, STUDY OF CLOSING COSTS, supra note
75, at 4 ("Mortgage brokers are like any other market seller of shoes or groceries who
buys at wholesale and sells at retail. Their goal as profit maximizers is to find the
cheapest wholesale terms and charge what the market will bear.").
95 MACRO INT'L, supra note 92, at 22.
96 Id. at 26.
97 Ben S. Bemanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Address at the Federal Reserve
System's Biennial Community Affairs Research Conference (Apr. 17, 2009), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bemanke200904l 7a.htm.
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In addition, disclosures do not appear to be unique in failing to elicit
consumer attention. Recent studies have tended to confirm the long-
suspected intuition that often consumers merely skim contracts or do not read
them at all-and of course such habits may carry over to how consumers
treat mandated disclosures, including TWLA disclosures. 98 Thus, one survey
found that significant majorities of consumers reported that they did not read
certain standard form contracts before agreeing to them.99 As an April Fool's
9 8 See MACRO INTERNATIONAL INC., DESIGN AND TESTING OF EFFECTIVE TRUTHi IN
LENDING DISCLO~uR~s 6, 11 (May 16, 2007) (report submitted to Fed. Reserve Bd.)
("Participants indicated that they would be unlikely to read a change-in-terms insert that
was included with their periodic statement, and would probably throw it away....
Participants paid very little attention to the [credit] cardholder agreement; only a few
participants looked at it at all, and these only skimmed it briefly. When asked, a vast
majority of participants indicated that they generally do not look at their cardholder
agreements. Most participants indicated that the reasons they do not read their
agreements are that the type size is very small and they find them difficult to
understand."); Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License to Deceive:
Enforcing Contractual Myths Despite Consumer Psychological Realities, 5 N.Y.U. J. L.
& Bus. 617, 656-57 (2009) ("One reason why consumers might not read contracts is that
the contract forms are often user-unfriendly. Font sizes are often very small, and the
clauses within sentences can be very long, which can make it physically difficult and
taxing for consumers to read. These user-unfriendly features increase fatigue, particularly
among the elderly, stroke survivors, and anyone who is even moderately visually
impaired. In addition, the long length of what the consumer is expected to read can cause
consumers to decide to at most skim, rather than carefully read, the documents they
sign." (footnotes omitted)).
99 Shmuel I. Becher & Esther Unger-Aviram, The Law of Standard Form Contracts:
Misguided Intuitions and Suggestions for Reconstruction 12 (unpublished manuscript)
(Aug. 7, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract--1443908. The three contracts at
issue were for a car rental, laundry services, and opening a bank account. See id at 9. The
exception, which does not seem analogous to mortgage loan papers, was for a nursery
school placement. See id. Many consumers did claim, however, that they would skim the
contracts before signing them. Id at 12. Factors reported to most strongly influence the
likelihood that a consumer would read a contract included the costs of the transaction, the
possibility of changing or improving contract terms, and the length of the contract. Id. at
18; see also Stark & Choplin, supra note 98, at 694-95, 699-700 (22.9% of sample
acknowledged not reading purchase agreement when buying home; 6. 1% of those with
mortgage admitted not having read any terms in loan documents; of those who reported
reading loan documents, 77.4% stated they had not read all the terms; authors concluded
the "self-reported level of the public reading all of the terms of their loan documents is
highly unlikely to be accurate" and noted that a research assistant who had formerly been
a mortgage broker took over three hours to read all the terms for a typical home loan; the
percentage of consumers who reported they did not read all the terms in the following
types of contracts appears after the type of contract on the following list: car rental
contracts: 71%; packaged good terms: 89%; terms on downloading software: 95%;
apartment rental agreement: 43%).
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joke, a computer game company added to its online contract a provision
granting the company the "immortal soul" of customers agreeing to the
contract; 88% of its customers sold their souls even though they could have
clicked on a "simple tick box" to opt out, which would also have brought
them a five pound voucher. 100
Other researchers tested whether consumers read disclosures by giving
study participants a consent form described as follows:
The second paragraph was a long-winded explanation of informed
consent, but buried three quarters of the way through this paragraph, was a
sentence suggesting that participants should not sign this consent form as its
terms were clearly not in their best interests.... Buried within the fifth
paragraph... .were clauses that... committed participants to administering
electric shocks to fellow participants, if instructed to do so, even if that
participant screamed, cried, and asked for medical assistance. It also
required participants to do push-ups if the experimenter instructed them to
do so. 101
More than 95% of the participants signed the form, and most did so
without even skimming it.102 The experimenters then explained that the
consent form had been a fake and asked participants to sign a genuine
consent form.' 03 More than a third of those who had signed the bogus form
signed the actual consent form without reading it while only 21.8% read the
entire form; the average time spent looking at the actual form was sixteen
seconds.' 04 The lesson for those designing disclosures seems clear: many
consumers will not read forms even after learning that they have been
deceived by failing to read such a form-and of course many of the subprime
borrowers who later defaulted may have been deceived by their failure to
read the TWLA disclosure form.
100 See 7,500 Online Shoppers Unknowingly Sold Their Souls, Fox NEWS, Apr. 15,
2000, http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/20 10/04/1 5/online-shoppers-unknowingly-sold-
souls!. The clause stated that the company:
[R]eserveld] the right to serve . .. notice in 6 (six) foot high letters of fire, however
we can accept no liability for any loss or damage caused by such an act. If you a) do
not believe you have an immortal soul, b) have already given it to another party, or
c) do not wish to grant Us such a license, please click the link below to nullify this
sub-clause and proceed with your transaction.
Id
101 Stark & Choplin, supra note 98, at 679.
10 2 Id. at 68 1.
103 Id at 680.
104Id at 682.
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The TWLA disclosures also face other impediments at conveying loan
terms, as discussed in the next subsection.10 5
F. Other Problems for Borrowers
Scholars have identified several conditions that impair consumers' ability
to make optimal borrowing decisions. 106 Among these are that many
consumers lack the financial sophistication to understand loan documents. 107
105 See Examining the Billing, Marketing, and Disclosure Practices of the Credit
Card Industry, and their Impact on Consumers: Hearing before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110 th Cong. 15-16 (statement of Michael D.
Donovan, Partner, Donovan Searles, LLC)
Disclosures are only useful for consumers when all of the following conditions
exist -
" The consumer has the opportunity to read the disclosures fully;
" The disclosures are unambiguous and understandable;
" The disclosures are true and apply to the entire term of the contract;
" The consumer has the knowledge and sophistication to understand the meaning of
the information provided in the disclosures;
- The consumer has the opportunity to make choices based on the information
gained through the disclosures.
The TILA disclosures seemingly fail on all of these counts.
106 See Sumit Agarwal et al., Do Consumers Choose the Right Credit Contfracts? 4
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 2006-119, 2006), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract--843826 (finding that about 40% of credit card customers chose
sub-optimal contracts).
107 See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-280, CONSUMER
PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING
PREDATORY LENDING 97 (2004) [hereinafter GAO: CONSUMER PROTECTION] ("Even a
relatively clear and transparent system of disclosures may be of limited use to borrowers
who lack sophistication about financial matters, are not highly educated, or suffer
physical or mental infirmities."); Engel & McCoy, supra note 72, at 1280 ("[T~he typical
victims of predatory lenders are unsophisticated about their options."); Lauren E. Willis,
Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price,
65 MD. L. REv. 707, 728 (2006) ("[S]ubprime loan pricing and structure are
nontransparent to many consumers, creating information asymmetries between borrowers
and loan sellers that can be exploited by the latter."); ESSENE & APGAR, supra note 68, at
iii-iv ("Given that the mortgage transaction has multiple time and cost dimensions,
consumers often are unable to determine what actual risks they face over time... . While
standard economic theory assumes that consumers shop for the best available price and
terms, even the most sophisticated borrowers often find it difficult to effectively shop for
mortgages."); Press Release, Consumer Federation of America, Lower-Income and
Minority Consumers Most Likely to Prefer and Underestimate Risks of Adjustable Rate
Mortgages (July 26, 2004), available . at
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In Judge Posner's words, "not all persons are capable of being careful
readers."' 08 Some borrowers either do not realize they need to know more1 09
or do not wish to incur or cannot afford the cost of acquiring more
information."10 The result is described by a former mortgage lender: "On
many occasions I've seen borrowers at the closing table develop that deer in
the headlights look.""' When borrowers cannot appreciate the significance
of loan terms, lenders are free to do with those terms what they Wjll.1 12
http://consumerfed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/filehousing/O72604/ARMSurv
eyRelease.pdf.
Significant numbers of consumers are financially illiterate. See Lewis Mandell,
Consumer Knowledge and Understanding of Consumer Credit, 7 J. CONSUMER AFF. 23,
35 (1973) ("[W]ith the exception of those who are well educated and fairly affluent, most
consumers have great gaps in their knowledge and understanding of the credit market.");
Annamaria Lusardi, Financial Literacy: An Essential Tool for Informed Consumer
Choice? 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W14084, 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1 149331 ("[Mlost individuals cannot perform
simple economic calculations and lack knowledge of basic financial concepts ....
[Ilgnorance about basic financial concepts can be linked to ... poor borrowing
behavior."); see also Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract,
13 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 233, 237-39 (2002) ("[L]arge numbers of adults have limited
quantitative literacy skills.. .. 96% of American adults cannot extract and compute credit
cost information from contract and disclosure documents.... The degree of literacy
required to comprehend the average disclosure form and key contract terms simply is not
within reach of the majority of American adults."); Jos6 Antonio Rosa, Madhubalan
Viswanathan, & Julie A. Ruth, Emerging Lessons, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2008, at R12
(reporting that 14% of Americans are estimated to be functionally illiterate).
108 Emery v. Am. Gen. Fin., 71 F.3d 1343, 1347 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Durkin &
Elliehausen, supra note 17; at 128 ("There can be little doubt, however, that
understanding credit disclosures is daunting for most recipients and beyond the
capabilities of some to absorb the information.").
109 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 39, at 12 ("Consumers do not seek to acquire
more information because they are not aware that they need more information or that
more information is available for them to acquire. Put differently, an imperfectly rational
consumer might not be aware of the fact that she is uninformed.").
1 10Id at 13 ("Consumers are uninformed because information is costly to
acquire.").
111 BITNER, supra note 44, at 133.
112 See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1207 (2003) ("When a contract term is non-
salient to most purchasers, the market check on seller overreaching is absent, and courts
should be suspicious of the resulting term. Put slightly differently, whenever a term in a
form contract is non-salient to most purchasers, those purchasers are incompetent to
protect their interests vis-A-vis that term."); cf Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 99, at
3 ("[Wlhere consumers are not aware of the content of their contracts, sellers have a
profit incentive to provide contractual terms of the lowest quality possible.").
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Indeed, some lenders have sought out unsophisticated borrowers because of
their inability to recognize the unsuitability of loan offers,"13 while others
target borrowers experiencing financial stress who may consequently be less
able to give loan terms their full attention. 114 Some of these lenders employ
high-pressure tactics, which further diminish the ability of borrowers to think
through their decisions.' t15
The complex loans typical in subprime lending also worsen the problem
by making it more difficult for borrowers to understand their loan terms.'116
11 See, e.g., Engel & McCoy, supra note 72, at 128 1-83 (describing how predatory
lenders identify unsophisticated borrowers and noting "hard-sell tactics capitalize on...
borrowers' lack of experience with this new breed of lenders and their complex
products"); Linda E. Fisher, Target Marketing of Subprime Loans: Racialized Consumer
Fraud & Reverse Redlining, 18 BROOK. J.L. & POL'Y 121, 124 (2009) ("Employing
techniques ranging from sophisticated demographic analyses of defined geographic areas
to arrangements with local brokers in low-income urban neighborhoods, these subprime
lenders focused on borrowers with little knowledge of mortgage lending in general and
their own financial options in particular."). But see FTC Workshop, supra note 44, at 154
(statement of Paul Willen, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston) (Lenders "targeted the most
complex mortgages to the most sophisticated borrowers.").
114 Willis, supra note 107, at 770 ("Subprime home lender marketing strategies
attempt to reach potential borrowers at times of stress, when the borrowers are more
likely to truncate their reasoning. One method is to target marketing efforts to consumers
whom sellers know to be in some financial crisis.").
115 See, e.g., Engel & McCoy, supra note 72, at 1307 ("This state of affairs puts
unsophisticated loan applicants at risk of high-pressure tactics at closing, where
borrowers may learn for the first time that they will be paying higher interest, points, or
fees. Confronted by surprise disclosures, they need financial or legal advice at the exact
moment that they have to commit. Without that advice, fearful that they will lose their
loans and desperate for funds, most borrowers sign the closing documents. "); see also
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 47, at 62 ("One former loan officer at a national subprime lender
stated in an interview that loans are pushed hard once a lead is found. He stated that,
upon receiving leads, loan solicitors begin 'badgering the hell' out of potential borrowers,
calling them at least four times per day. He said that loan officers are taught very specific
ways to market their loans, from always including a cashout provision to selling to the
borrower's emotions-to 'sell the dream."').
116 See, e.g., Engel & McCoy, supra note 72, at 1284 ("[P]redatory lenders rarely
make plain-vanilla, fixed-rate loans with easily understood payment terms. Most
predatory loans contain terms that require borrowers to make difficult probabilistic
computations about the likelihood and magnitude of future market events that are entirely
outside their control."); Woodward, Consumer Confusion, supra note 75, at 4; BARR ET
AL., supra note 48, at 8 ("How many homeowners really understand how the teaser rate,
introductory rate and reset rate relate to the London interbank offered rate plus some
specified margin, or can judge whether the prepayment penalty will offset the gains from
the teaser rate?"); EsSENE & APGAR, supra note 68, at i, 15 ("[M]any consumers have a
limited ability to evaluate complex mortgage products and they often make choices which
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Thus, the Government Accountability Office found that disclosures for
complex mortgage loans "were generally written with language too complex
for many adults to fully unesan,'1 as is surely true of the loan term
quoted above.' 18 Choosing among different types of loans, even from the
same lender, requires understanding many such terms. 119 Oren Bar-Gill and
they regret after the fact.. .. Unlike simple products that typically have a single price
component, loan pricing is a combination of interest rates, points, fees, prepayment
penalties, and other factors. Moreover, features such as interest rates and prepayment
penalties vary constantly in response to changing economic conditions. This makes it
difficult for consumers to track, no less learn how the various components of price relate
to one another."); see also GAO: ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGE PRODUCTS, supra note 10, at
2 (Alternative mortgage products "often have complicated terms and features" and so
consumers may not fully understand their risks); Bar-Gill, supra note 68, at 1102-03;
Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Consumer Credit: The
Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REv. 808, 890-91, 901 (2003)
(describing how high-cost lenders strategically try to keep price hidden as long as
possible and how one way they do so is by making their products complex to hinder
understanding: "The result is that there is no single easily comparable figure which
describes the price a borrower will pay for financing-but, to the casual observer it looks
like there is."); Willis, supra note 107, at 766 ("Because subprime loan structures are
more complicated than prime loan structures, subprime borrowers must attend to even
more loan features than prime borrowers to assess loan price, and thus they are more
likely to become overloaded when attempting the task."); Zywicki & Adamson, supra
note 2, at 56 ("The difference in outcomes between the prime and the subprime market
may be partly the result of different levels of sophistication or education among
borrowers, but more important is that subprime loans are simply more complex than
prime mortgages, both in the complexity of the individual terms (for example, adjustable
versus fixed rates) and the total number of relatively complex terms."); ESSENE & APGAR,
supra note 68, at 11.
1 17 GAO: ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGE PRODUCTS, supra note 10, at 9. The GAO
added, at pages 8-9:
AMP disclosures generally did not conform to leading practices in the federal
government, such as key "plain English" principles for readability or desig....
Most of the disclosures also used small, hard-to-read typeface, which when
combined with an ineffective use of white space and headings, made them even
more difficult to read and buried key information.
118 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
119 Bar-Gill explains:
Consider a borrower facing a 2-28 hybrid and an option ARM: The 2-28 has an
introductory period and an initial rate. The option ARM has a different introductory
period during which four different payment options are available. The 2-28 specifies
an index and a margin for the postintroductory period with certain caps on rate
adjustments. The option ARM specifies a different index, a different margin, and
different adjustment caps.... In reality the borrower must choose between more
than two products.
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Elizabeth Warren have observed that "comparison among [mortgage]
contracts is challenging even for a professional."12 0 Consumers are also
barraged with an assortment of fees, which may be itemized separately,
further distracting them from contemplating whether the loan is beyond their
reach.' 21 The result, in Susan Wachter's words, is that "[ilt is nearly
impossible in the subprime world to shop."' 22
Many consumers do so little searching for mortgages when they do seek
one that they are not likely to acquire the needed expertise even then.'123 One
study found that even after the mortgage meltdown, the average borrower
spent five hours shopping for a mortgage, while 31% spent two hours or
Bar-Gill, supra note 68, at 1106 (footnote omitted).
120 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 39, at 13; see also Joan Warrington, on Durkin &
Elliehausen, supra note 17, in THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON CONSUMER CREDIT 145,
146 (Thomas A. Durkin & Michael E. Staten eds., 2002) ("Even with a law degree and a
career in consumer credit, I still have problems understanding many of the disclosures
that I see.").
121 Bar-Gill, supra note 68, at 1 102-06 (2009) (listing numerous fees).
122 FTC Workshop, supra note 44, at 18 (statement of Susan Wachter); see also
Peterson, supra note 116, at 890 ("[T]here are strong indications that, at least in the
market for high-cost credit, Truth in Lending has failed almost entirely in promoting
price informed borrowing decisions among the most vulnerable debtors.").
123 Jinkook Lee & Jeanne M. Hogarth, Consumer Information Search for Home
Mortgages: Who, What, How Much, and What Else, 9 FIN. SERVS. REv. 277, 285, 288
(2000) (reporting that 40% of consumers seeking mortgages "claimed to do almost no
searching or only a little searching; about one-third (32%) reported doing a moderate
amount of search and over one-fourth (28%) claimed to do a lot or a great deal of
searching.... [T]he median number of loans compared was 3 and the median number of
terms and features considered was 6.... One out of seven refinancers (15%) reported
they did not compare any terms and one-fourth (26%) of other mortgage borrowers
reported not comparing any terms."); ICF MACRO REPORT, supra note 33, at iii ("Only
about half of [the focus group members] consulted more than one lender or broker when
looking for a mortgage loan."); REEDHALDYMCINTOSH, INSIGHTS INTO THE MINORITY
HOMEBUYING EXPERIENCE; THE MORTGAGE APPLICATION PROCESS 9 (2003), available at
http://www.nw.org/networklcomstrat/minorityownership/documents/insights.pdf (most
homebuyers in their focus groups "did not actually comparison-shop for the best terms
for their mortgage. Many did not think such comparisons were possible."); see id. at 9
("The few [focus group] participants who considered multiple mortgage applications to
permit closer comparisons were discouraged from doing this by the penalties associated
with repeated requests for credit scores."); see also Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg.
44,525 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) ("In this environment of
limited transparency, consumers-particularly those in the subprime market--may
reasonably decide not to shop further among originators or among loan options once an
originator has told them they will receive a loan, because further shopping can be very
costly. Shopping may require additional applications and application fees, and may delay
the consumer's receipt of funds.").
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less.124 The Fed has concluded that "[dlisclosures themselves, likely cannot
provide this minimum understanding for transactions that are complex and
that consumers engage in- infrequently."12 5 And advertising does not cure the
problem, because it often focuses on price options not available to all
consumers, and so may add to, rather than dispel confusion.'126 Similarly, the
Government Accountability Office has observed that advertising for
alternative mortgage products (AMPS) "sometimes emphasizes the benefits
of AMPS over their risks," leading to confusion.' 27
Consumers lacking the ability to understand their loan terms may turn to
mortgage originators for help.' 28 Thus, the FTC study explained: "Many of
124 Despite Mortgage Meltdown, Today's Borrowers Continue to Spend Twice as
Much Time Researching a Car Purchase as Researching Their Home Loan, ZILLOW,
http://zillow.mediaroom.com/index.php?s-l159&item=201 (last visited Aug. 18, 2010).
125 Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 1,676 (proposed Jan. 9, 2008) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
12 6 See Atlanta Public Hearing, supra note 10, at 155, 156 (statement of Patricia
McCoy, University of Connecticut School of Law) (noting that lenders quote "their best
prices in general advertisements, even if most of their subprime customers would not
qualify for those prices.... Many of these ads are affirmatively misleading. They'll have
a low teaser rate, very low, that is really a prime market teaser rate. And then, say, bad
credit, no problem in the same ad. That lures people in. There will be no disclaimer that
the interest rate could go up, according to your credit worthiness."); ESSENE & APGAR,
supra note 68, at 16.
127 GAO: ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGE PRODUCTS, supra note 10, at 2. The GAO
elaborated at page 7:
For example, one advertisement we reviewed promoted a low initial interest
rate and low monthly mortgage payments without clarifying that the low
interest rate would not last the full term of the loan.
In other cases, promotional materials emphasized the benefits of the AMPs
without effectively explaining the associated risks. Some advertising, for
example, emphasized loans with low monthly payment options without
effectively disclosing the possibility of interest rate changes or mortgage
payment increases. One print advertisement we reviewed for a payment-option
ARMv emphasized the benefits of a low initial interest rate but noted in small
print on its second page that the low initial rate applied only to the first month
of the loan and could increase or decrease thereafter.
128 Kellie K. Kim-Sung & Sharon Hermanson, Experiences of Older Refinance
Mortgage Loan Borrowers: Broker- and Lender-Originated Loans, 83 AARP PPI DATA
DIGEST 1 , 3 (2003), available at http://assets.aarp.orglrgcenter/post-
import/dd83_loans.pdf (study finding 70% "of older borrowers with broker-originated
refinance loans reported that they relied 'a lot' on their brokers to find the best mortgage
for them"); see also Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,526 (July 30, 2008) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) ("[C]onsumers may rely more on their originators to
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the respondents who said that they understood the disclosures reported that
they had not been able to understand the disclosures on their own, but had
relied on their originators or closing agents to explain them."' 29 Again, that is
consistent with the finding in our study that most brokers explained the
disclosures to their borrowers. But another study found that not all borrowers
were satisfied with the ensuing results.' 30 While it is undoubtedly the case
that many loan originators offer excellent advice, others clearly do not.
Because mortgage brokers are typically compensated for arranging for loans,
and not for counseling against borrowing, they have an incentive to
encourage consumers to borrow,' 3' and in fact some critics claim that some
originators actively mislead borrowers. Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A.
McCoy have reported that "[s]ome lenders resort to out-and-out fraud. Other,
more sophisticated lenders make truthful disclosures as required by law, but
use a variety of hard-sell tactics."'132 Thus, Michael Hudson described the
experiences of loan officer Philip White in these words:
He entered a world, he says, where cunning and deception were standard
tools of the trade, where customers were routinely snowed by confusing
explain the disclosures when the transaction is complex."); Lee & Hogarth, supra note
123, at 285 ("Lenders, specifically, banks, savings and loans, and credit unions were the
most popular sources for information.").
129 LACKO & PAPPALARDO, supra note 47, at 3 1; see also id at ES-6 ("Other[]
[borrowers] relied primarily on their loan officer or mortgage broker to explain the loan
terms ... rather than examining and verifying the loan terms themselves."); cf Willis,
supra note 107, at 766 ("[M]any borrowers think they do not have to price shop because
they are paying a broker or loan officer to do that for them.").
130 See Kim-Sung & Hermanson, supra note 128, at 4 (2003) (21% of older
borrowers in study "reported that they did not receive a loan that was best for themn;" 23%
said they did not feel the rates and terms of their mortgage were fair; and 19% felt they
had not received "accurate and honest information about their loans").
131 Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,526 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 226) ("[S]omne originators may have incentives to misrepresent the disclosures
so as to obscure the transaction's risks to the consumer; and such misrepresentations may
be particularly effective if the originator is face-to-face with the consumer."); Bar-Gill,
supra note 68, at 1128-29 ("Borrowers commonly seek the advice of mortgage brokers
who face an incentive structure that prevents them from being loyal agents of the
borrower.").
132 Engel & McCoy, supra note 72, at 1283; see also GAO: CONSUMER
PROTECTION, supra note 107, at 94 ("[Ajbusive lenders and brokers may use high-
pressure or 'push marketing' tactics-such as direct mail, telemarketing, and door-to-
door contacts-that are unfair, deceptive, or designed to confuse the consumer.");
GRAMLICH, supra note 78, at 33 (predatory lenders often "have loan quotas to meet,
regardless of whether the loans would do the borrowers any good, and their salespeople
use high-pressure techniques to meet their quotas.").
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paperwork and sleight-of-band salesmanship.... White, who eventually
rose to assistant branch manager, claims customers were also misled about
upfront points and other finance charges. The attitude was: "If you had to
lie about the points that we charged, lie to 'em. They're stupid anyway." 13 3
And a predatory lender testified before Congress:
I have seen finance company employees commit forgery on a massive scale.
These employees have forged everything from insurance forms, RESPA
documents, income verification forms, and even entire loan files....
.. I can get around any figure on any loan sheet....
... The customers believe what I tell them. 134
133 Michael Hudson, Signing Their Lives Away. Ford Profits from Vulnerable
Consumers, in MERCHANTS OF MISERY: How CORPORATE AMERICA PROFITS FROM
POVERTY 42 (Michael Hudson ed., 1996); see id at 42 (reporting on experiences of loan
officer Philip White: "Many customers didn't--or couldn't-read their loan
documents.. .. White says they frequently never saw forms disclosing broker's fees, and
loan officers often added in hundreds, even thousands of dollars in charges for credit
insurance-without asking them if they needed it. White says higher-ups told him, 'If
you don't have to tell 'em and they don't ask, don't tell 'em. Just get 'em to initial it.
They're big people. They can read-most of them anyway."'); see also Jacobson Aff.,
supra note 77, at 4, 6 (stating that loan officers told customers that pre-payment penalties
could be waived when in fact they could not be and that some loan officers falsified loan
applications); Paschal Aff., supra note 77, at 7 ("[I]t was implied in trainings that Wells
Fargo loan officers should not mention that subprime loans included a prepayment
penalty if the borrower paid off or refinanced his loan before the prepayment penalty
period ended or that the monthly payments on the ARM loans would substantially
increase. When an applicant asked a loan officer about prepayment penalties or monthly
payment increases, the loan officer would tell the applicant not to worry because Wells
Fargo would later be able to refinance him into a prime or an FHA loan."); Hudson,
supra, at 42; TED JANUSZ, KICKBACK: CONFESSIONS OF A MORTGAGE SALESMAN 7-9
(2006) (describing how his firm employed attractive scantily-clad closing agents to
distract borrowers from reading the numbers at the closing so the firm could manipulate
the figures).
134 Equity Predators: Stripping, Flipping and Packing Their Way to Profits:
Hearing Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 105th Cong. 34, 37, 38
(statement of "Jim Dough") (pseudonym); see also LACKo & PAPPALARDO, supra note
47, at 29-30 (Borrowers' "various misunderstandings also suggest that loan originators,
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Similarly, the authors of one study of borrowers in certain Chicago zip codes,
after noting that the "overwhelming majority" of borrowers with adjustable-
rate loans believed that they had fixed-rate loans, observed: "In every case
where borrowers were surprised to be told they were receiving an adjustable
rate loan, the Loan Originator had told the borrower that the rate was 'fixed'
but neglected to mention that the term for which the rate was 'fixed' was
limited to 12 to 36 months."' 35
It thus appears that some consumers believe what they are told rather
than what they read-if they read-in disclosure documents.'136 Lenders who
engage in such tactics find easy prey in those who cannot understand their
loan terms and so lack the capacity to discover that they are being
deceived.'13 7
at least in some cases, may have misled borrowers about the features of their loans, and
that the current disclosures were not sufficient to overcome these deceptions."); ILL.
DEP'T OF FIN. AND PROF'L REGULATION, supra note 10, at 4 (2007) ("Borrowers tend to
trust what they are told by their Loan Originator or Mortgage Broker rather than
reading and understanding what is written in the Disclosures given to them." (emphasis
added)).
135 ILL. DEP'T OF FIN. AND PROF'L REGULATION, supra note 10, at 3-4.
'36 Atlanta Public Hearing, supra note 10, at 166 (statement of John C. Kozup,
Director, Center for Marketing and Public Policy, Villanova University) ("I was on the
phone this morning with a member of my advisory board who runs a bank. He says, I've
closed thousands of real estate loans. They don't read [disclosures]. I cannot think of a
handful of times when the customers came in with questions about it. He said, they trust
me.,,).
137 LACKO & PAPPALARDO, supra note 47, at 123 ("Consumers who do not
recognize key loan costs also will be more vulnerable to deceptive lending practices that
aim to hide or misrepresent loan costs. The failure of the current disclosures to convey
key loan costs to many consumers may make it easier for some lenders to engage in
deceptive practices. Many of the FTC's deceptive lending cases have involved loan terms
that the current disclosure forms have particular difficulty conveying to consumers, such
as optional credit insurance, balloon payments, prepayment penalties, and the financing
of high fees and optional charges in the loan amount. Lenders in these cases may have
used deceptive practices to take advantage of the inability of many consumers to
recognize these terms in the current disclosure forms."); see also GAO: CONSUMER
PROTECTION, supra note 107, at 97-98 ("[R]evised disclosure requirements would not
necessarily help protect consumers against lenders and brokers that engage in outright
fraud or that mislead borrowers about the terms of a loan in the disclosure documents
themselves."); Zywicki & Adamson, supra note 2, at 73 ("In short, due to the complexity
and sheer volume of documentation associated with a home mortgage, there is a large
information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders that makes borrowers highly
vulnerable to fraud and oppression by lenders."). Nor does it seem to matter that
borrowers can choose among many mortgage originators. See Richard M. Hynes & Eric
A. Posner, Law and Economics of Consumer Finance 6 (Univ. Chicago Law &
Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 117, 2001), available at
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Even originators who will not stoop to outright lies may find it both
useful and possible to confuse borrowers as to loan costs,13 8 by, for example,
increasing the transaction costs borrowers incur in deciphering loan ternis. 139
Thus, originators may manipulate fees to complicate disclosures;' 40 they
have an incentive to hide as many costs as possible, thereby making loans
http://papers.ssm.com/paper.taf~abstract-id=26 1109 ("Even if there are numerous
lenders in a market, each lender may have some degree of market power because of the
inability of consumers to costlessly compare prices and terms. Depending on the source
of the information failure, this may result in either an abnormally high price or
abnormally harsh terms. Some creditors will lend only to those consumers who are
unable to compare the (price or nonprice) terms of the loan offered with the terms
available elsewhere in the market.").
138 See Improving Federal Consumer Protection in Financial Services. Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, I110th Cong. 98 (2007) (statement of Sheila
C. Hair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) ("In addition to the
complexity of the underlying product, aggressive or misleading marketing can have a
negative impact on the ability of borrowers to make informed credit decisions. Without
complete and balanced information, consumers may not realize that they may be unlikely
to afford the required monthly payments of credit products-particularly when a loan
includes an initial teaser interest rate that will expire."); ESSENE & APGAR, supra note 68,
at ii ("[S]ome marketing and sales practices appear to cross the line. Instead of supporting
informed choices, aggressive and misleading marketing can play on consumer fears and
lack of knowledge. In fact, some individuals and firms on the market's supply side use
their considerable knowledge of consumer behavior to aggressively "push market"
inappropriate mortgage products.").
139 See generally Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model of Consumer Protection: The
Problem of Inflated Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635 (2006).
140 See Bar-Gill, supra note 68, at 1122 ("Increased complexity may be attractive to
lenders, as it allows them to hide the true cost of the loan in a multidimensional pricing
maze.... For example, if the tax certification fee and the late payment fee are not salient
to borrowers, lenders will raise the magnitude of these price dimensions. Increasing these
prices will not hurt demand. On the contrary, it will enable the lender to attract borrowers
by reducing more salient price dimensions. This strategy depends on the existence of
nonsalient price dimensions. When the number of price dimensions goes up, the number
of nonsalient price dimensions can also be expected to go up. Lenders thus have a strong
incentive to increase complexity and multidimensionality." (citation omitted)); Willis,
supra note 107, at 724-25; see also Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 39, at 54 ("Mortgage
borrowing is much more complex because lenders have disaggregated fees. The cost of
borrowing money now includes a number of fees, such as origination fees (including
document-preparation fees, underwriting-analysis fees, tax-escrow fees, and escrow-
fund-analysis fees) that are often not disclosed until late in the purchasing process. It is as
if a person purchasing a car discovered only at the time of sale that there would be
additional charges for paint, for a bumper, and for tires. Such additional charges would
likely be omitted from the buyer's initial estimates of affordability and would escape
inclusion as the buyer compared different loan options.").
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look more affordable, 14' or to use terminology that implies cheaper loans.
For instance, Susan Woodward found that borrowers who pay "discount
points" to mortgage brokers end up paying "an extra $109 in total costs for
each $100 paid in points."' 42 Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren have
added that "sellers design their products to exploit consumers' imperfect
information and imperfect rationality."14 3
A November 1997 First Alliance Mortgage Company loan officer
training manual, titled "FAMCO Loan Officer Track"' (Track Manual),
together with the affidavit of a former First Alliance loan officer, illustrate
one way predatory lenders sell loans.'144 The Track Manual, which includes a
script for officers to use when speaking with loan applicants, opens with
standard instructions about smiling, appearing likeable and building a
rapport.' 45 Every page is stamped "confidential," and many include a box
with the words "Remember: It is FAMCO's policy to disclose completely
and fully all aspects of the loan transaction."'14 6 At many stages, the script
directs the loan officer to ask if the borrower has any questions: "How about
the questions you were afraid to ask? How about the ones you were a little
embarrassed to ask? How about the ones you'll wish you asked when you get
home?"'47 So far, so good.
The Track Manual also directs loan officer to offer helpful advice to
borrowers, warning borrowers against making late payments: "Don 't be late;
it's just money down the drain. "148 The script includes the following in bold
print: "Often customers attempt to borrow more than what they really need.
Since borrowing is so expensive, FAMCO generally suggests that the
customers borrow the least amount they need & pay it back as fast as they
can. ""49 But the point that is made most forcefully and frequently, and at
considerable length, with diagrams, is that much of the money the borrower
pays to the lender is interest, and the borrower can save a good deal of that
by prepaying the mortgage: "Did you realize that by the time you finish
"41 FTC Workshop, supra note 44, at 80 (statement of David Laibson) ("Firms are
going to minimize the perceived costs of their loans. They are going to do that by putting
as many of the costs as possible into the shrouded category.").
142 WOODWARD, STUDY OF CLOsING COSTS, supra note 75, at 62.
143 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 39, at 46.
14 Apparently later editions of the Track Manual exist. See In re First Alliance
Mortg. Co., 298 B.R. 652, 657 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (referring to April 1999 edition).
14 See FAMCO Loan Officer Track 5 (1997) (on file with author).
146 See, e.g., id. at 28.
1471Id. at 3 8.
148 Id. at 26.
19I.at 22.
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paying off this house, you actually agreed to pay off at least 3 houses?" 150
The point is made again:
[Tjhere are basically two ways to save money on a mortgage, aren 't there?
By reducing the rate or by shortening the term. But the best way is to do
both, isn 't it? Unfortunately, [at this point, the loan officer is to point to a
diagram] when you shorten the term, you raise the payment. And, who
wants that? Wouldn 't it be great to lower the overall rate, shorten the
overall term, and keep the overall payments the same or lower? Then you 'd
kill 3 birds with one stone, wouldn't you?1 5 1
And again: "All you have to do is to send in an extra $224.70 per month with
your payment. And if you do that every month, you 'll have your house paid
for completely in 15 years instead of 3Oyears." 52
All true, and unobjectionable. Perhaps the Track Manual's authors feared
that it would end up becoming public, or disclosed in litigation, and so wrote
it with that in mind, or perhaps their hearts were pure. But the affidavit of
Greg Walling, a former First Alliance loan officer, puts the Track Manual in
a different light.' 53 Walling went through FAMCO's month-long training
program, which included "memorizing and practicing delivery of the Track
presentation."' 54 Walling explained:
The Track presentation and First Alliance's sales methods are highly
effective at getting consumers to enter into loans without understanding the
fees charged for the loan or the increasing interest rate on the ARM loans.
First Alliance charges loan fees for home refinancing loans that are
incredibly high, even for the "subprime" market segment. First Alliance
leads consumers to enter into loans for which the consumer does not
understand the amount of loan fees that he or she has been charged by First
Alliance. The vast majority of First Alliance borrowers obtain an adjustable
rate mortgage ("ARM"). These consumers also do not understand that their
ARM loan from First Alliance has a "teaser rate" that will adjust upwards
'
5 0 Id. at 6.
151 FAMCO Loan Officer Track, supra note 145, at 20.
12I.at 28.
153 Affidavit of Greg Walling, Memorandum in Support of the State's Motion for a
Temporary Injunction, State v. First Alliance Mortg. Co., No. C9-98-1 1416, Minn. Dist.
Ct., 2d Judicial Dist., Cnty. of Ramsey (filed on Dec. 21, 1998) [hereinafter Walling
Aff.].
15 Walling Aff., supra note 153, at 2.
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by several percentage points if market interest rates do not change after the
date of loan closing. 155
As for the helpfiul advice, Walling affied:
The first nine steps of the Track presentation get the consumer to think
about the total cost of paying off the mortgage over thirty years, rather than
the costs and fees for writing the loan. In other words, the Track focuses the
consumer's attention solely on the idea that the most important part of a
mortgage is paying back the loan in a shorter time. In my experience, if the
consumer bought into the idea that time was the enemy in a mortgage, he or
she was unlikely to notice, understand or raise questions about the huge
loan fees charged by First Alliance. 156
Walling's affidavit also accounted for why the TWLA disclosures-and
particularly the APR disclosure-did not dissuade borrowers:
I also described the term APR to the consumer. I told the consumer that
when we talk about loans we talk about three different rates. The three rates
I described were the "interest rate," the "APR" and the "yield." I told the
consumer that the interest rate was what the consumer and I care about, that
the APR is what the federal government cares about, and that the bank cares
about the yield. I told consumers that APR was just an estimate and that it is
always higher than the interest rate. [Walling then described how he drew a
chart comparing the numbers on hypothetical loans.] ....
I explained to the consumer that as the term of the mortgage is
shortened ... the APR increases, the interest rate stays the same, and the
yield decreases. I used the above chart to reinforce the message that it is the
total payments on the loan that should be the only concern to the consumer
and that "time" is the enemy with a mortgage. As I was trained, I never told
consumers the reason that the APR increased and the yield decreased as the
term of the mortgage was shortened was due to the origination fee being
spread over a shorter term.157 The only other information about APR I
155 Id. at 5.
156 Id. at 6-7.
157 The court elaborated on this point in In re First Alliance Mortgage Co.:
First Alliance's statement about the APR is correct in that the APR will
increase as the loan term is shortened by extra principal payments. However, the
reason the APR increases in this circumstance is that the loan origination fee and
other loan fees, comprise a greater percentage of the "finance charge" while the
"amount financed" is constant, and thus the finance charge rises as a percentage of
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would ever share with the consumer was that it was calculated over the
whole period of the loan. When I was questioned about the APR on any of
the later disclosure forms, I would refer consumers back to the above hand-
drawn chart or I would show the consumer the actual Note with the note
rate, and I would try to re-focus their attention on the total payback over 30
years. I was trained by First Alliance to bring [the] customer's attention
back to this hand-drawn chart whenever I received a question about APR. I
would never say that APR was a measure for comparing the cost of credit or
make any statement that suggested APR offered useful information to the
consumer. I would always use the note interest rate when describing the
cost or rate of the loan, not the APR...
Customers that agreed to the loan terms ... were given numerous
forms to sign.... This process usually only took about 15 minutes. It was
easy to get these customers to sign the forms because I had already
convinced them through the Track presentation that they understood the
terms of the loan and what was important about those loan terms. When
customers asked questions about the federal disclosure forms, I would
reiterate the appropriate part of the Track presentation, or answer the
questions as described above without ever telling them they were paying
extremely high loan fees or a [sic] getting an interest rate that would
significantly increase in about the first two years even if market rates
remained stable. 15 8
Walling described other techniques for avoiding answering questions
from borrowers that might result in the borrower understanding how high
First Alliance's fees were:
If the consumer persisted in asking about the amount of the loan, I
would attempt to re-direct their inquiry. For example, if a couple asked how
much they would owe if they paid off the loan tomorrow, I would respond
by asking if they planned to pay off the loan tomorrow. When they said
"no," I would say "then it really doesn't matter, does it?" Or I would
respond to their question by saying that there was only one way that they
the amount financed. The amount of the APR increase is considerably less with a
lower loan origination fee and a shorter term loan. But with the huge First Alliance
fees implicit in the example, the APR increase was dramatic. First Alliance
intentionally did not disclose this information. This presentation led consumers to
discredit the APR when it was later disclosed on the federally required Truth in
Lending Statement.
298 B.R. 652, 657 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
158 Walling Aff., supra note 153, at 7-9, 13.
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could pay off the loan tomorrow, and that would be to win the lottery, in
which case none of what we talked about today would matter.'159
Walling also reported that he would leave borrowers alone in a room,
and eavesdrop on them discussing what terms they would find acceptable,
which First Alliance would then use in fashioning its offer.'160
First Alliance's tactics are obviously troubling, and ultimately brought it
to a bad end; in the words of the Ninth Circuit, it "was driven into
bankruptcy and subsequent liquidation by well-publicized and justified
allegations of fraudulent lending practices." 16' Yet its practices find echoes
in the survey of mortgage brokers, in that borrowers were not familiar with
the APR disclosure, went through the TWLA forms quickly, and seemed not
to use them to make decisions.
Of course, many originators eschew all of these tactics. But that does not
mean that they view it as their role to convey to borrowers the risks they will
assume'by agreeing to a mortgage. New York Times reporter Edmund L.
Andrews quoted loan officer Bob Andrews of the now-defunct American
Home Mortgage Corporation:
"I am here to enable dreams," he explained to me .... Bob's view was
that if I'd been unemployed for seven years and didn't have a dime to my
name but I wanted a house, he wouldn't question my prudence. "Who am I
to tell you that you shouldn't do what you want to do? I am here to sell
19I.at 11. Among the findings of fact the court made in In re First Alliance
Mortgage Co. were:
First Alliance's loan presentation was designed to obfuscate the loan
origination fee, and other fees and prepaid interest and true principal sum of the loan
from the consumer borrower....
First Alliance's loan officers were taught to present the state and federal
disclosure documents in a manner that was both confusing and misleading. The
presentation was so well performed that borrowers had no idea they were being
charged points and other fees and costs averaging 11I percent above the amount they
thought they had agreed to borrow. This amount did not include the undisclosed loan
origination fees, other miscellaneous fees, or prepaid interest charged to the
borrowers.
298 B.R. at 657-58.
160 Walling Aff., supra note 153, at 12.
161 In re First Alliance Mortg. Co., 471 F.3d 977, 983 (9th Cir. 2006).
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money and to help you do what you want to do. At the end of the day, it's
your signature on the mortgage-not mine." 162
Nor does anyone one else in the mortgage lending system have an incentive
to explain to borrowers the risks of assuming large obligations. In David
Laibson's words:
[I]n the mortgage market, there are lots of choices that individuals will
make that may be beneficial to a mortgage originating firm, and there is no
economic incentive for another firm to de-bias the consumer who was
involved in these transactions.
For example, who is going to say to a consumer, if you buy this large
house, you will be spending too much of your income on housing? ...
... [T]he market does not have an incentive to inform individuals about
these facts, because the person who is going to make money ... is the firm
that is going to interact with the consumer who is, let's say, unaware of
these possibilities. 1 63
Brokers are also said to discourage borrowers from speaking to other
brokers, thus reducing the likelihood that borrowers will learn of better
terms. 164
In addition, borrowers may suffer from cognitive disabilities that
interfere either with their understanding of loan terms or their ability to
appreciate the significance of the terms.1 65 Information overload famously
162 Edmund L. Andrews, My Personal Credit Crisis, N.Y. TimES SUNDAY MAG.,
May 17, 2009, at 48.
163 FTC Workshop, supra note 44, 77-78 (statement of David Laibson).
164 See BiTNER, supra note 44, at 46 ("[Blrokers advise their borrowers not to talk to
competing brokers ..... )
165 See Bar-Gill, supra note 68, at 1079-80 (noting that many borrowers are
"imperfectly rational"); Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 39, at 46 ("[IUmperfect
information and imperfect rationality pervade credit product markets"); Debra Pogrund
Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A Cognitive and Social Psychological Analysis of Disclosure
Laws and Call for Mortgage Counseling to Prevent Predatory Lending, 16 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 85, 97 (2010) (listing fourteen "cognitive and social psychological
factors that cause disclosure forms to be ineffective"); Marianne Bertrand et al., What'~s
Psychology Worth? A Field Experiment in the Consumer Credit Market 5 (Yale U. Econ.
Growth Ctr. Discussion Paper No. 918, 2005), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract -id=770389 (experiment with South
African consumers found that psychological manipulations affected demand for loans,
and that psychological factors "appear relatively more effective . .. when the interest rate
is high"); BARR ET AL., supra note 48, at 2 ("Because people are fallible and easily
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degrades decision-making.' 66 Moreover, studies have demonstrated that
consumers suffer from systematic tendencies to Optimism.'16 7 As Oren Bar-
misled, transparency does not always pay off and firms sometimes have strong incentives
to exacerbate psychological biases by hiding borrowing costs.").
166 See Atlanta Public Hearing, supra note 10, at 93 (statement of Ken Logan,
Chairman-Elect, National Home Equity Mortgage Association) ("[lt is NIIEMA's
position and my personal experience as a lender that the quantity and nature of the
information disclosed is simply too much and detailed for the average borrower to digest
over any period of time and that borrowers would be better served by simpler and more
targeted disclosures."); Willis, supra note 107, at 767; Zywicki & Adamson, supra note
2, at 60 ("[Bjorrowers can see up to fifty total disclosures, including those required by
lenders and state laws."). See generally John C. Bergstrom & John R. Stoll, An Analysis
of Information Overload with Implications for Survey Design Research, 12 LEISURE Sci.
265 (1990); Kevin Lane Keller & Richard Staelin, Effects of Quality and Quantity of
Information of Decision Effectiveness, 14 J. CONSUMER REs. 200, 211 (1987); Naresh K.
Malhotra, Information Load and Consumer Decision Making, 8 J. CONSUMER RLES. 419
(1982). Early studies included Jacob Jacoby et al., Brand Choice Behavior as a Function
of Information Load: Replication and Extension, 1 J. CONSUMER RES. 33 (1974), and
Jacob Jacoby et al., Brand Choice Behavior as a Function of Information Load, I11 J.
MARKETING RES. 63 (1974). For criticism of the early Jacoby studies, see, e.g., Naresh K.
Malhotra, Reflections on the Information Overload Paradigm in Consumer Decision
Making, 10 J. CONSUMER REs. 436 (1984) (suggesting that information overload does
occur, but that the early Jacoby studies did not demonstrate it); J. Edward Russo, More
Information is Better: A Reevaluation of Jacoby, Speller and Kohn, 1 J. CONSUMER RES.
68 (1974); John 0. Summers, Less Information Is Better?, I11 J. MARKETING RES. 467
(1974); William L. Wilkie, Analysis of Effects of Information Load, 11I J. MARKETING
RES. 462 (1974). For Jacoby's replies, see Jacob Jacoby et al., Constructive Criticism and
Programmatic Research. Reply to Russo, 2 J. CONSUMER RES. 154 (1975), and Jacob
Jacoby, Information Load and Decision Quality: Some Contested Issues, 14 J.
MARKETING RES. 569 (1977). For studies rebutting the information overload effect, see
Naresh K. Malhotra et al., The Information Overload Controversy: An Alternative
Viewpoint, 46 J. MVARKETING 27 (1982); Thomas E. Muller, Buyer Response to Variations
in Product Information Load, 69 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 300 (1984); Debra L. Scammon,
"Information Load"~ and Consumers, 4 J. CONSUMER RES. 148 (1977). For criticism of
these last studies, see Jacob Jacoby, Perspectives on Information Overload, 10 J.
CONSUMER RES. 432 (1984). For criticism of the Keller & Staelin study cited above, see
Robert J. Meyer & Eric J. Johnson, Information Overload and the Nonrobustness of
Linear Models: A Comment on Keller and Staelin, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 498 (1989).
Keller and Staelin's response appears at Assessing Biases in Measuring Decision
Effectiveness and Information Overload, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 504 (1989). For law
review discussions of information overload, see David M. Grether et al., The Irrelevance
of Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277
(1986), criticized in Melvin Eisenberg, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305 (1986);
Robert E. Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking: An Essay on the
Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL. L.
REV. 329 (1986).
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Gill has observed, optimistic borrowers may underestimate future payment
hikes, overestimate future income, and assume that housing prices will rise
so that future payment increases will not matter because they will be able to
refinance.' 68 Originators eager to make loans may exacerbate these
tendencies.' 69 In consequence, borrowers may not give sufficient
consideration to future payment increases. 170 The problem is worsened still
further by the tendency of adjustable-rate loan borrowers to underestimate
the amounts by which their rates can increase. 17 1
167 See David A. Armor & Shelley E. Taylor, When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma
of Unrealistic Optimism, in H4EURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT 334, 334 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) ("One of the most robust
findings in the psychology of prediction is that people's predictions tend to be
optimistically biased."); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contfract
Law, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1743, 1782 (2000) (contracting parties tend to be "unrealistically
optimistic"); Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal
Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1659 (1998) ("[Pleople are often unrealistically optimistic
about the probability that bad things will happen to them. A vast number of studies
support this conclusion."); Dan N. Stone, Overconfidence in Initial Self-Efficacy
Judgments: Effects on Decision Processes and Performance, 59 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAv. & Hum. DECISION PROCESSES 452, 453-54, 468 (1994) (citing studies that
demonstrate consumer optimism); Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L.
REv. 751, 772-74 (2003) ("With respect to most of the risks of life, people appear to be
unrealistically optimistic."); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life
Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 806, 818-19 (1980).
168 Bar-Gill, supra note 68, at 1078-79, 1119-20. These payment hikes may be
significant. See FisH-BEIN & WOODALL, supra note 72, at 20 (describing how monthly
payments may more than double).
169 See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,542 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 226) ("[O]riginators may sometimes encourage borrowers to be excessively
optimistic about their ability to refinance.... For example, they sometimes offer
reassurances that interest rates will remain low and house prices will increase; borrowers
may be swayed by such reassurances because they believe the sources are experts."); Bar-
Gill, supra note 68, at 1120-2 1.
170 Willis, supra note 107, at 778 ("Components of loan price that are uncertain at
the time of loan purchase, or that do not come into effect until sometime long after the
first monthly payment, are almost certainly underweighted, if not ignored altogether, in
borrower decisionmaking. The popularity of loans with 'teaser rates,' adjustable rates that
will, with certainty, increase in six months or a year, is due to this bias. Consumers are
even more likely to fail to appreciate the true future costs of a loan when these costs are
not only in the future, but also uncertain, such as where the interest rate is tied to an
index." (footnote omitted)).
171 See Bucks & Pence, supra note 5 1, at 2.
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Consumers in the late stages of taking out a loan may also experience the
status quo effect-a preference for staying with the status quo172-or a
variant of the endowment effect, the tendency of consumers to want to retain
possessions they have had, however briefly. 173 The status quo for a consumer
obtaining a loan is to proceed with the loan. Similarly, though, strictly
speaking, a loan is not a possession; the proceeds of the loan enable
consumers to obtain a possession: a house, or in the case of a refinancing,
perhaps home renovations or additional purchases. While the consumer will
not possess those proceeds until the closing, perhaps the anticipation
functions just as the endowment effect does: to increase the desire of the
consumer to retain the item they have dreamed of.174 In any event, both
effects may drive consumers to move forward with the loan, regardless of its
merits.
In short, consumers contemplating borrowing may encounter originators
with an interest in persuading them to borrow-an interest that sometimes
drives originators to act badly-but our existing system does not provide
borrowers with anyone with a contrary interest or a neutral perspective to
expose them to the arguments against borrowing. Those arguments are
172 See Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance
Decisions, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 224, 235- 38 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky eds., 2000); Raymond S. Hartman et al., Consumer Rationality and the Status
Quo, 106 Q. J. ECON. 141, 143-44 (1991); Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 197
(199 1); William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making,
1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1988); J. Michael Collins, You Could Lose Your Home:
The Effects of State Policies Mandating Subprime Mortgage Risk Disclosures on
Consumer Evaluations of Loan Offers 13 (July 1, 2008) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.ssm.com/abstract-1 505668 ("To the degree that loan applicants
exhibit a bias in favor of the status quo, they will refrain from reversing a decision even
when reminded of the potentially catastrophic risks by the disclosure or when given time
to exert self-control.").
173 The endowment effect is illustrated by a series of experiments reported in Jack
L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves, in
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 172, at 171-79. In one experiment, subjects
were given a coffee mug and invited to trade it for a candy bar; 89% preferred the mug.
Id at 172-73. Another group of subjects was provided with a candy bar and invited to
exchange it for a mug; 90% of that group preferred the candy bar. Id In other words, the
subjects preferred ownership of an object they had possessed momentarily over
something they did not yet have. See also Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991)
(additional experiments); Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment
Effect and the Coase Thzeorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1342 (1990) ("instant endowment
effect").
174 See Stark & Choplin, supra note 165, at 102-03.
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theoretically displayed in the TWLA disclosure statement, in the form of
monthly payments which may exceed the borrower's ability or desire to pay,
but, as we have seen, those payments may be understated, are likely to be
ignored, may be beyond consumers' ken, and, finally, borrowers can be
persuaded to disregard them.
G. Attempts to Fix TILA
In 2008, Congress amended TWLA to address some of its problems.' 75
Regulators also amended lending regulations in 2008 and 2009 and
undoubtedly more such amendments are on the way.' 76 These amendments
changed both the content and the timing of the disclosures; as for the timing,
until July 30, 2009 (the month our survey was conducted), disclosures were
due no later than the loan closing, when they might have been lost in a
mountain of forms, while now lenders are obliged to let borrowers know of
changes in key loan terms at least three days before the closing.' 77 Congress
also directed the Federal Reserve to include in the disclosures for adjustable
loans a "worst-case" scenario showing what the highest-possible monthly
payment might be.' 78 Changes to Regulation X, which went into effect on
January 1, 2010, implementing the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(RESPA),' 79 also include information about loan terms, including, on page
three, for borrowers who make it that far, the maximum monthly payment.18 0
175 See MDIA, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2855.
176 For regulations that have been promulgated, see, e.g., Truth in Lending, 73 Fed.
Reg. 44,522 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226); Truth in Lending, 74
Fed. Reg. 23,289 (May 19, 2009) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226). The Federal
Reserve has also proposed amendments to improve mortgage disclosures. See Truth in
Lending, 74 Fed. Reg. 43,232 (proposed Aug. 26, 2009) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
226).
177 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.19(a)(2)(ii) (2010) (promulgated under 74 Fed. Reg.
23,289).
178 15 U.S.C.A. § 1638(b)(2)(C)(ii) (West 2010). The changes will not take effect
until the earlier of the date upon which the Federal Reserve or the new CFPB
promulgates regulations implementing months after July 30, 2008. See MDIA, 122 Pub.
L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2857. The Federal Reserve has since proposed such
regulations, see Truth in Lending, 74 Fed. Reg. 43,232 (proposed Aug. 26, 2009) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226), and issued an interim rule to implement the MDIA, see
Regulation Z, Truth in Lending, 75 Fed. Reg. 58,470 (interim rule Sept. 24, 2010) (to be
codified at 12 G.F.R. pt. 226).
179 Pub. L. No. 94-205, 89 Stat. 1157 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (2006)).
18 Regulation X can be found at 24 C.F.R. pt. 3500 (2010). The Settlement
Statement provided at the closing, known as the HUD- 1, indicates on page three whether
the interest rate can rise, by how much over the life of the loan, when the first change
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These are certainly improvements.'18' But it is not clear how effective the
timing changes are, nor how effective the TWLA worst-case scenario
disclosure will be once it is implemented. The same consumers who did not
walk away from inappropriate loans at the closing may be unwilling to
cancel the transaction if they discover that the terms are not to their liking
three days earlier.
Nor can we be sure that consumers will take enough time with the
disclosures three days before the closing to understand them. To be sure, the
changes may indeed help some consumers who learn through reading forms
to understand their obligations better. Thus, the FTC Study found that
improved disclosures generated improved understanding.'182 But even these
improved disclosures had their limits: some consumers could not answer
questions correctly even with the enhanced disclosures in front of them.'183 I
addition, the FTC Study may have produced higher comprehension rates than
occur in genuine transactions, as its authors noted.' 84 Real-world borrowers
face time pressures, stresses, and originators who may be unscrupulous,
unlike the consumers in the study.'18 5 Interviewees in the study also resided in
a more affluent, better-educated county than is typical.186 All had recently
date is, how frequently change dates occur, how much the interest rate can rise at each
change date, and how much the monthly payments can rise. See 24 C.F.R. pt. 3500, App.
A (2010).
181 An early report on the new RESPA disclosures stated that "some brokers say that
borrowers are asking more questions, and are very likely becoming better informed as a
result, if a bit frustrated at times. Others report a mere shift in the nature of borrower
confusion." Bob Tedeschi, New 'Good Faith' Takes Hold, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2010, at
RE9.
182 LACKo & PAPPALARDO, supra note 47, at 12.
183 Even with an improved disclosure form, borrowers answered an average of 20%
of the questions incorrectly, suggesting that the improved form would not solve all the
problems. Id at ES-7-ES-8. In some cases, the numbers were worse. "Forty-one percent
of prototype form respondents, for example, could not identify the amount of prepayment
penalties ... and 30 percent did not recognize that the loan included a large balloon
payment .... ". Id at ES-9.
184 See id. at 122.
185 Id. ("These findings may be even stronger in real-world transactions. Although
in real-world transactions borrowers will have greater incentive to understand loan costs,
because their homes and savings are at risk, they also may face a number of factors that
make it more difficult to understand their loan costs. The consumer testing was conducted
in a quiet, experimental setting. Respondents did not face the time pressure of a loan
closing, a large stack of other closing paperwork, or deceptive tactics aimed at obscuring
loan costs, all of which are likely to aggravate the difficulties consumers have
understanding their loan terms.").
16I.at 14-15.
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taken out mortgages'187 and so were already at least partway up the mortgage
learning curve. True, perhaps even better disclosures than those tested in the
FTC Study might improve comprehension rates still further. But in all
probability, even better disclosures will fail to address some of the problems
discussed above.' 88 Some consumers need more than written disclosures.
Those who are financially illiterate will simply not learn from even perfect
written disclosures, while predatory lenders seem unlikely to be defeated by
mere paper disclosures no matter how wonderful or well-timed they are. 189
Similarly, educators have discovered that different people learn
187 LACKO & PAPPALARDO, supra note 47, at 14.
188 See Engel & McCoy, supra note 72, at 1309 ("[l]ncreased disclosure is not
enough because lenders will always find ways to evade disclosure requirements.
Furthermore, most victims of predatory lending already find current disclosures
incomprehensible. For naive borrowers, piling on more disclosures will not help. The
high-pressure nature of closings only exacerbates that confusion, by discouraging
borrowers from reading loan documents at closing or asking questions when they do.
Because most borrowers are not represented at closing, moreover, questions are likely to
result in self-serving answers by title company officials or lenders. More disclosure
would simply compound the confusion that currently exists."); see also Philadelphia
Public Hearing, supra note 61, at 26-27 (statement of Ira Goldstein, Director of Policy
and Information Services, The Reinvestment Fund) ("The consensus is that financial
literacy is woefully inadequate. Assuming that a written notice will overcome that, no
matter how plain language that is, is plainly naive."); Atlanta Public Hearing, supra note
10, at 92 (statement of Ken Logan, Chairman-Elect, National Home Equity Mortgage
Association) ("[Ilt is our conclusion that tweaking the disclosure regimen to address only
non-traditional products will not result in the fundamental issue of whether the regimen
serves the purpose of effective disclosure to borrowers from a macro perspective.");
Warrington, supra note 120, at 147 ("Disclosures alone are not going to teach financial
literacy.").
189 Predatory lenders could, for example, obscure the required disclosures by
overloading the borrower with other information. Or perhaps they could convince
borrowers that the worst-case scenario is improbable, and rely on the optimism bias to
make that claim convincing. Or maybe they will attempt to insure that the consumer is
psychologically committed to the loan before the disclosures arrive or switch from
adjustable loans to those that squeeze money from borrowers in other ways. See BARR ET
AL., supra note 48, at 6-7 ("[E]ven if meaningful disclosure rules can be created, sellers
can undermine whatever before-the-fact or ex ante disclosure rule is established, in some
contexts simply by 'complying' with it: 'Here's the disclosure form I'm supposed to give
you, just sign here.' . . . While an ex ante rule provides certainty to creditors, whatever
gave the discloser incentives to confuse consumers remains in the face of the regulation.
While officially complying with the rule, there is market pressure to find other means to
avoid the salutary effects on consumer decisions that the disclosure was intended to
achieve.").
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differently.' 90 Some learn well through reading while others learn better
through listening.' 9 ' Congress would do better to understand that some
consumers simply lack the ability to learn from written disclosures, and that
such consumers require a completely different approach to understand their
loans.
In sum, existing consumer protection law seems unlikely to prevent
future borrowing binges of the sort that led to the 2008 economic crisis.
Accordingly, the Article now explores some possible alternatives.
111. FIxING THE PROBLEM
Obviously, the misleading disclosures described above should be fixed
so that they accurately convey the consumer's payment obligations, and
Congress has begun that effort.' 92 But even if the disclosure forms had been
perfect-even if, for example, lenders could accurately predict future interest
rate fluctuations and so disclose at the time of closing what the borrower's
future payments would be-disclosure forms that consumers ignore would
still be of little value. Consequently, the Article now turns to some different
approaches to the problem.
190 See Elaine Kumnar et al., Learning Style Preferences: A Comparison of Younger
and Older Adult Females, 10 J. NUTRITION FOR THE ELDERLY 21, 22 (199 1) ("Learning
styles are an individual's characteristic way of processing infornation, feeling, and
behaving in a learning situation. .. )
191 See, e.g., Rita Dunn & Joanne Ingham, Effects of Matching and Mismatching
Corporate Employees' Perceptual Preferences and Instructional Strategies on Training
Achievement and Attitudes, 11I J. APPLIED Bus. R~s. 30, 33 (1995) ("Employees with an
auditory preference who were taught with a lecture and visuals obtained significantly
higher test scores than when taught with the tactual/kinesthetic approach and visuals....
Employees with a tactuallkinesthetic preference who were taught with the tactual
kinesthetic method produced higher (.01) test scores than when they were taught with the
lecture supplemented with visuals. In addition, the mismatch of preference and method
generated statistically lower test scores."); see also Sharon Marie Hoffer, Adult Learning
Styles: Auditory, Visual, and Tactual-Kinesthetic Sensory Modalities iv (Aug. 1986)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Texas A&M University), available at
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=74868997 1 &sid=63&Fmt-=2&clientld=2945&RQT
=309&VName=PQD&cfc=1 ("[Aldults do possess a dominant sensory modality through
which they learn more effectively across subject matter. .. )
192 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. For one proposal for what the
disclosures should look like, see Patricia A. McCoy, Rethinking Disclosure in a World of
Risk-Based Pricing, 44 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 123, 153-54 (2007).
2010] 819
820 OHIO STATE LA WJOURNVAL [o.7:
A. Moving From a Disclosure Regime to a Comprehension Regime
TiLA's ultimate goal is to enable understanding of loan terms. That
understanding serves many purposes, including increasing the likelihood that
consumers will act in accordance with their preferences so that credit markets
will function appropriately. Indeed, if consumers understand their loan terms,
it becomes less necessary for the government to proscribe objectionable loan
terms. 193 When consumers fail to become aware of or understand loan terms,
the governmnent must intervene to bar overreaching contract terms because
consumers are unable to protect themselves. 194 But when consumers
understand loan terms, they at least theoretically have a greater ability to seek
competing offers from lenders that offer better terms.
Disclosure is an intermediate step on the path to comprehension.'19 5
Consequently, if understanding is the goal, it makes sense to focus on that
goal rather than an intermediate step that has proved to lead only imperfectly
to comprehension and has permitted consumers to borrow uwsl.196
How can we move from a disclosure regime to a comprehension regime?
Ideally, policymnakers would come up with a scheme under which lenders
wanted consumers to understand their loan terms. Doing so would result in
those who are best able to convey loan terms to consumers having a stake in
193 Cf Marianne A. Hilgert et al., Household Financial Management: The
Connection Between Knowledge and Behavior, 2003 FED. REs. BULL. 309, 309 (2003),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2003/0703lead.pdf
("Knowledgeable consumers who make informed choices are essential to an effective and
efficient marketplace. In classical economics, informed consumers provide the checks
and balances that keep unscrupulous sellers out of the market. For instance, consumers
who know the full range of mortgage interest rates and terms in the marketplace, who
understand how their credit-risk profile and personal situation fit with those rates and
terms, and, consequently, who can determine which mortgage is best for them make it
difficult for unfair or deceptive lenders to gain a foothold in the marketplace.").
194 For example. in the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified as amended at scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.A.), Congress outlawed certain provisions in credit card contracts; if
consumers understood those terms and preferred alternatives, classic economic theory
predicts that some credit card lenders would offer them to entice more customers, but this
seems not to have happened, perhaps because consumers lacked the financial acumen to
comparison-shop for such terms. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666i-1 (West 2010) (limiting
power of credit card issuer to increase interest rates and fees for balances).
195 Cf Jinkook Lee & Jeanne M. Hogarth, The Price of Money: Consumers'
Understanding of APRs and Contract Interest Rates, 18 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 66,
74 (1999) ("[Mjandatory disclosure of information itself does not help consumers make
effective credit decisions unless they understand the information provided.").
196 See BARR ET AL., supra note 48, at 2.
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the process of communicating the relevant information. Originators are the
best able to convey loan terms because they actually deal with consumers,
have a measure of control over the presentation of information at the closing
and before, can observe what works and what doesn't, and can then improve
the methods for conveying information. One way to do this is simply to
impose on lenders a requirement that borrowers understand their loan terms;
that is to say, bar lenders from completing loans until they could demonstrate
that a significant proportion of their borrowers understood the terms of their
loans.
Doing so would cure many of the problems with TWLA. First, it would
shift the incentives of lenders so that they have an interest in insuring that
consumers understand their payment obligations, rather than, as in some
cases (like the cases involving First Alliance), obscuring those payment
obligations. Second, it would get the government out of the business of
deciding how to communicate to borrowers-an enterprise that the
government is not the best actor to engage in, especially given that the
government is not a party to the loans and does not deal directly with
borrowers-and shift that burden to lenders, who are already communicating
with borrowers and have considerable experience in judging how best to
further that communication.
If lenders are required to care about whether consumers understand the
information, they can be expected to take steps to insure that consumers are
not distracted by differences between the APR and the interest rate when
they receive the information and that borrowers receive the forms in a way
that enables them to absorb the information the forms contain. They
presumably would take as much time as is required to convey the terms,
rather than devoting only a minute or less to them. In short, focusing on
understanding rather than the mechanical task of supplying disclosures
sharply increases the probability that the information will be understood.
Lenders might respond by increasing the readability of loan forms, using the
same attention-getting strategies that their marketing arms use to sell their
services. They might even abandon incomprehensible terms if the cost of
using such terms exceeds the benefits,
A somewhat less politically unrealistic alternative would focus on
creating competition to increase the likelihood that consumers would read
forms. For example, if regulators required lenders to conduct consumer
testing of their forms and then publicize the results, lenders might compete
for higher comprehension scores. That is to say, lenders might prefer not to
disclose worse comprehension scores than their competitors, and so might
increase the intelligibility of their forms. A lender might not wish to disclose
that, say, half its borrowers could not understand its forms when other
lenders reported that 80% of their customers understood their forms. Again,
8212010]
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lenders might respond not only by increasing the comprehensibility of their
forms, but also by eliminating terms that borrowers could not understand.
Such a requirement might discourage lenders from lending to poorly-
educated or less financially-literate borrowers-the borrowers who would
benefit the most from an increased focus on comprehension, rather than
disclosure. Obviously, it is not desirable to deter lenders from lending to
creditworthy but unsophisticated borrowers. Accordingly, it might be
necessary to devise some way of taking into account borrower sophistication
in the comprehension grades to avoid this disincentive.
What kinds of terms ought to be covered by such a comprehension
requirement? Essentially, any term that might materially affect the
consumer's payment obligation. In identifying the relevant terms, it is best to
start with a broad standard and then give examples of some such terms. The
alternative-of identifying the terms that consumers should understand-
risks repeating one of the problems with TILA. The original TILA
disclosures were chosen at a time when most mortgages consisted of twenty-
or thirty-year fixed-rate loans-so called "plain vanilla" loans. Disclosures
created in such an environment were not well-suited to the far more complex
products lenders created later, such as loans with fixed rates for the first two
or three years, and adjustable rates thereafter, payment option ARMs,
interest-only loans, or negative-amortization loans. No doubt the lack of fit
between TILA's plain vanilla disclosures and the more complicated loan
terms in use in the last decade contributed to the failure of consumers to
understand their payment obligations. Any regime that applies to specified
terms without having the flexibility to incorporate others as lending changes
risks becoming outmoded by those changes. It also risks encouraging
predatory lenders to create new loan products that generate excessive returns
for lenders while evading consumer understanding of the products. Requiring
comprehension of terms that might materially affect the consumer's payment
obligation avoids those risks. But to give guidance to lenders and avoid
litigation over precisely what must be disclosed, a statute should also give
concrete examples of what consumers must understand.'197
A comprehension regime may not work perfectly, however. First,
consumers might not care about the scores, and so publication of the scores
might not have any impact. It is impossible to know without some form of
19 Such examples should include, at a minimum, the current disclosures required
for mortgages. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.18 (2010). The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (2006), uses a similar structure. For example, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e
proscribes "false, deceptive, or misleading representations," and also identifies in sixteen
paragraphs specific practices that violate that prohibition.
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testing. Second, as discussed above,' 98 some evidence exists to indicate that
even when consumers understand -information, to the extent that the
information conflicts with what they believe, they will not absorb and act
upon it. That evidence remains to be confirmed, but if it is confirmed, to the
extent that consumers would need to act on information that conflicts with
their beliefs, even understanding the information might not prevent them
from acting inconsistently with their best interests. In such cases, an outright
ban on certain terms might be necessary.
A comprehension regime represents a dramatic departure from the
current disclosure approach and is unlikely to become law anytime soon.
Consequently, in Subsection B, the Article considers ways to increase the
probability that consumers benefit under the existing regime.
B. Enhancing Understanding within a Disclosure Regime
The purpose of this subsection is to suggest reforms that will increase the
effectiveness of a disclosure regime.' 99 In a sense, the goal is to identify
strategies that lenders might adopt in a comprehension regime and then
impose them on a disclosure regime. That is to say, instead of focusing solely
on disclosure, policymakers might ask how a lender which genuinely wished
to inform consumers of loan terms might proceed, and then select from
among those possibilities choices that offer easy enforceability. Such a lender
would test to verify that its strategies worked, and so the suggestions
described herein should also be subjected to consumer testing-which might
demonstrate that they are ineffective, in which case they should be scrapped.
Many reasons may contribute to the little attention given to TILA forms.
Disclosure forms are not fun to read.2 00 This is hardly surprising given their
content and provenance. Further reducing consumer eagerness to peruse
them is the fact that they must compete with other claims on consumer
attention. In addition, lenders who wish to obscure unfavorable terms might
affirmatively act to reduce the likelihood that consumers attend to them.20'
Moreover, disclosure forms present information that some consumers might
not be interested in learning. To the extent that disclosure forms convey
198 See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
19 Of course, these suggestions might also help if Congress switched to a
comprehension regime.
200 See Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the "Opportunity to Read" in Contract Law
I (John M. Olin L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 415, 2008), available at
http://www. law.uchicago.edullawecon/index.htmi (Reading standard form contracts "is
boring, incomprehensible, alienating, time consuming, but most of all pointless.").
201 See supra notes 138-60 and accompanying text.
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information that consumers might interpret as bad news, consumers might
not want to take that information in. For example, adjustable-rate loan
disclosure forms that communicate that monthly payments might increase to
unaffordable amounts in the future might be unwelcome. Such forms also
compete with the optimism bias, which empirical researchers have
demonstrated causes consumers to overlook negative information, creating
cognitive dissonance. Accordingly, just to get borrowers to read and take
account of the information in disclosure forms might be a challenge.
Consequently, regulators must come up with a method to give consumers
an incentive to read the forms, or more precisely, make consumers aware of
why they have an interest in reading the forms. The book Nudge by Cass
Sunstein and Richard Thaler describes how to change "choice architecture"
so that consumers are able to make better decisions-but still retain the
freedom to make those decisions-and so this section draws on their work.202
An example of such a nudge would be if applicants for credit were
obliged to watch a video showing the pain default brings, applicants might be
more attentive to the disclosure forms.203 The video could list the cost of
default and foreclosure, including late fees, collection fees, legal fees, loss of
a home, the need to find a new home and the costs of moving, prepayment
202 Thaler and Sunstein describe a nudge as "any aspect of the choice architecture
that alters people's behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or
significantly changing their economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the
intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid." THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 6.
In their view, "people will need nudges for decisions that are difficult and rare, for which
they do not get prompt feedback, and when they have trouble translating aspects of the
situation into terms that they can easily understand." Id. at 72. That seems to describe
mortgage borrowing fairly well.
203 Cf Atlanta Public Hearing, supra note 10, at 148"9, 168 (statement of Vanessa
Gail Perry, George Washington University School of Business) ("Consumers will be
motivated to attend to and to process disclosure information if the information is
personally relevant. That is, the information pertains to the specifics of their financial-
their financial situation. In addition, consumers will be motivated to utilize disclosure
information if they perceive a high level of risk in the transaction. Consumers will
perceive a higher degree of risk if the communication suggests that substantial financial,
social, or other interests are at stake.... So how do we motivate consumers to use
disclosure information? One way is to introduce disclosure information with personally
relevant statements that communicate risk information. The statements that introduce the
disclosure of specific terms may be as important as the terms themselves. For example,
with this loan you will owe more than you do now, and you may face higher monthly
payments as a sort of introductory statement.... [IHf you start out by sort of scaring
them, that is, with some negative information and then you allow the consumer to control
the flow of information, what you've done is give them the information and give them a
reason to sort of take steps on their own to read the fine print or go to another part of the
disclosure.").
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penalties (if the borrower is able to sell the home), damage to the consumer's
credit rating, loss of whatever equity the consumer had in the home, and the
possibility of loss of other assets in states that permit lenders to satisfy
deficiencies out of such assets. Families can suffer severe disruptions, ending
up homeless, living in tent cities, or in overcrowded quarters.204
The video could explain the emotional toll of foreclosure. According to
Dr. Robert Gifford, an environmental psychologist, foreclosure can be
"deeply traumatic."205 Gifford claims that it undermines "a key part of well-
being: perceived control over your life."12 06 Gifford adds that when people
lose their home, "It's like their planet blew up."207 Clinical psychologist
Rosalind Dorlen reports that losing a home can cause depression and
anxiety.208
Anecdotal reports in the media may make the point more salient for
borrowers. For example, Bob Herbert of the New York Times described one
borrower's experiences:
Dorothy Levey, a 79-year-old widow . .. sits alone inside the small house
she has lived in for 41 years, afraid to answer the telephone or the door.
She has every reason to be worried. The monthly note on her house in
the city of Markham, just outside Chicago, is approximately 100 percent of
her meager monthly income. Broke and behind in her payments, Ms. Levey
expects a foreclosure notice to show up any day, followed by a visit from
"the sheriff, or whoever they send to tell you to get out of your own
home ...
... [S]he kept trying to meet her obligation. She exhausted her savings.
She lost her car. She stopped buying clothes and cut back on food. But there
was no way to keep up with the payments.
204 Julie Scelfo, After the House is Gone, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at Dl
(describing how a family, after abandoning its home, sleeps six to a bed and seven in a
room).
205 Id
207 Id.
208d; see also IMMERGLUCK, supra note 86, at 147 ("[Flinancial stressors such as
mortgage delinquency and default are thought to trigger anxiety, depression, and
addictive behaviors.").
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"I had to go to the state and tell them I was hungry," she said.209
But the video should not explain only the costs of foreclosure. It could
also make the risks of the wrong type of loan terms more salient for
consumers. For example, the video could explain that adjustable-rate loans
may bring with them future increases in payments, and the possibility that
housing prices would not increase sufficiently to permit refinancing. The
goal would be to increase the likelihood that borrowers would take such risks
into account in their planning. And the video should itself be tested to
determine whether it has the desired effect; if it doesn't, it should be
modified so that it does, or be replaced by another strategy.
Nudges can also be used to cause consumers to attend to particularly
problematic contract clauses.210 For example, if terms associated with an
increased risk of foreclosure -such as hybrid ARMs, prepayment penalties
and balloon payments-included bold-print legends such as, "This term may
cause you to lose your home," consumers might be more likely to explore
other options.211 A note indicating the percentage of borrowers in a recent
209 Herbert, Editorial, Lost in a Flood of Debt, supra note 52; see also Herbert,
Editorial, A Swarm of Swindlers, supra note 52 ("[Another borrower] told me her story in
the freezing living room of the house on Merrill Avenue, which no longer has a working
furnace and is growing shabbier by the day. It's all she has left. Her mother and her older
sister are dead now. Her only income is about $1,300 a month from Social Security-less
than the monthly note on the house, which is in foreclosure proceedings. . . . 'I'm
terrified,' Ms. Dailey told me as she wrapped a sweater tightly around her to ward off the
cold. 'I can't sleep anymore. They're trying to take the house away from me, and I
wanted to stay here until I died. That was what I was really trying to do.' . . . I asked Rosa
Dailey yesterday how she'd be spending her Thanksgiving. She said her money for the
month had run out, so she wouldn't be doing anything special. .. . 'I'll be right here,' she
said. 'I've got some corn flakes and canned vegetables. That'll be my Thanksgiving."'1).
2 10 Cf Collins, supra note 172, at 22 ("[T]his analysis [of high-cost refinance loans]
suggests that state laws requiring mortgage applicants to sign a disclosure warning 'you
could lose your home' result in a greater likelihood that consumers will reject an
approved high-cost refinance loan offer from a lender."); Erik F. Gerding, The Subprime
Crisis and the Link Between Consumer Financial Protection and Systemic Risk 22 (May
28, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract -id=129 1722 (published version of article
available at 4 FLA. INTL. U. L. REv. 435 (2009). but does not include quoted passage)
("To ensure that consumers mentally process the disclosure, regulations could require
that consumers copy important disclosure passages in their own handwriting. Additional
opt-in provisions and disclosure could be required for consumers to be bound by more
complex floating rate provisions.").
211 See SCHLOEMER ET AL., supra note 10, at 5, 21 (noting that terms that increase
risk of foreclosure "include adjustable interest rates, balloon payments, prepayment
penalties, and loans with limited documentation of borrowers' loan qualifications" and
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year who defaulted on loans containing such terms might also generate more
attention.212
Another step is to require consumers to draft a budget that brings home
to them how much (or little) money they will have available after meeting
their housing expenses under the loan. The act of constructing a budget
should force the applicant to read the form and increase the likelihood that
she masters its contents. In addition, with loans that offer the possibility of
future increases in monthly payments, the applicant should be obliged to
prepare budgets for future years on the assumption that the monthly
payments have increased to their maximum level.2 13 Doing so should help
the consumer understand the worst-case scenario and the risks the borrower
reporting that the foreclosure risk of ARMs is 62 to 123% higher than fixed-rate
mortgages, balloon payments increase the risk by 14 to 86%, and low- or no-
documentation loans carry a 5 to 64% greater risk); see also Roberto G. Quercia et al.,
The Impact of Predatory Loan Terms on Subprime Foreclosures: The Special Case of
Prepayment Penalties and Balloon Payments 1, 25 (Jan. 25, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript), available at
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi= 10.1.1.120.4308 ("We find that
[prepayment penalties and balloon-payment requirements] lead to a significant increase
in mortgage foreclosure risk, even after controlling for other risk factors. For instance,
refinance loans with prepayment penalties and those with balloon payments are more
likely to experience a foreclosure than loans without these characteristics-by about 20
percent and 50 percent, respectively. .. . [W]e estimate that the use of prepayment
penalties and balloon payment requirements in 1999 refinance originations increased
foreclosure-related losses by about $465 and $127 million nationally, respectively...
[A]djustable-rate mortgages have 50 percent greater odds of foreclosure than fixed-rate
loans."). Others have identified the mandatory arbitration clause as a clause that creates
difficulties for borrowers, because it may make class-action suits prohibitively expensive.
See GRAMLICH, supra note 78, at 67.
212 Barr et al. suggest what the authors call an ex post standards-based disclosure
requirement that asks "whether the disclosure would have, under common understanding,
effectively communicated the key terms of the mortgage to the typical borrower." BARR
ET AL., supra note 48, at 7. This approach differs from the one suggested herein in that
this paper focuses on the subjective understanding of the actual borrower while the Barr
et al. paper looks to whether a reasonable consumer would have understood the major
loan terms.
213 Oren Bar-Gill has argued that "ensuring robust competition in the subprime
mortgage market [will] not solve the problem" of borrowers taking out loans that provide
for low initial rates and excessive payments later in the life of the loan because some
borrowers irrationally prefer such loans and lenders eager to make loans will
accommodate such preferences. See Bar-Gill, supra note 68, at 1083-84 (citation
omitted). My hope is that the kind of nudges this paper suggests will counteract that
tendency.
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is taking that he will run short of funds and lose the home. 214 Presumably the
Countrywide borrowers who took out loans that would reset at unaffordable
levels within two or three years would have been less eager to do so if they
had understood what they were risking.
An example may bring home the value of constructing a budget. In 2006,
a Government Accountability Office report on alternative mortgage products
explored the problem of "payment shock" on a $400,000 payment-option
adjustable-rate mortgage. 215 Assuming rising interest rates, a borrower who
made only the minimum monthly payments on the loan would experience a
128% increase in payments after five years, from $1,287 to $2,931.216 As
Vincent DiLorenzo has observed, "Many borrowers would be unable to pay
the higher payments required of them, particularly if their ability to repay
was based on the low initial interest iate."217 But until the borrower
constructs a budget, the borrower may not realize that. Creation of a budget
would force the borrower to contemplate what changes the borrower would
make in her other expenditures in response to such a jump, and consequently
whether the loan is unaffordable.
The importance of creating a budget is also emphasized by the fact that
nearly a third of United States homeowners are thought to live in
unaffordable housing, and more than a tenth have severely unaffordable
housing.218 Preparation of a budget might have brought home to these
homeowners how such large housing expenditures would impair their ability
to meet other expenses.
Preparing a budget-indeed, even understanding the disclosure forms-
will nevertheless be beyond some loan applicants. Some borrowers are
financially illiterate.219 But these borrowers should not be barred from
borrowing if they are able to meet their obligations. They may require a
neutral credit counselor-not a mortgage broker who benefits from securing
214 Cf McCoy, supra note 192, at 147 ("[Ilt is essential that all borrowers, including
subprime borrowers, understand the worst case payment scenario before they take out 1-0
and option ARMs.").
215 See GAO: ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGE PRODUCTS, supra note 10, at 4-5 (statement
of Orice M. Williams, Director Financial Markets and Community Investment, U.S.
Government Accountability Office).
216 Id The GAO assumed "a I percent initial interest rate, a 7.5 percent annual
payment increase cap, and a 10 percent negative amortization cap." Id at 5 n.2.
217 DiLorenzo, supra note 20, at 38. But see Mayer et al., supra note 21, at 37
('ijTlhe distinguishing feature of the short-term hybrid mortgage-the change in the
mortgage rate two or three years after origination-does not seem to be strongly
associated with increased defaults . ..
218 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
219 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
Vol. 71:4828
2010] PREVENTING ECONOMIC CRISES82
them a loan-to advise them.2 20 Several studies have demonstrated the
efficacy of counseling for the populations studied. 22 ' An experiment in
Chicago provides additional guidance. Chicago required residents with
certain credit scores living in ten of its zip codes who sought high-risk
mortgages to submit to credit counseling. 22 2 Here is how one study
characterized the results:
[Clounseled borrowers pay similar interest rates to non-counseled
borrowers ... nevertheless, their leverage ratio is slightly lower, on
average. Importantly, loans originated by counseled borrowers during the
treatment period experienced markedly lower ex post default rates. These
results hold after controlling for improvements in the credit quality of the
borrower pool and for changes in the composition of the pool of available
lenders.... On the other hand, counseling did not appear to cause the
220 FTC Workshop, supra note 44, at 171 ("[A] benevolent smart agent can arrange
a better choice context."); Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94
IOWA L. REV. 197, 198 (2008) ("Consumers generally do not serve as their own doctors
and lawyers and for reasons of efficient division of labor alone, generally should not
serve as their own financial experts.").
221 See Abdighani Hirad & Peter Zorn, Prepurchase Homeownership Counseling: A
Little Knowledge Is a Good Thing, in Low INCOME HOMEOWNERSHIP: ExAMINING THE
UNEXAMINED GOAL 146, 146-47 (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2002) ("We
find statistical evidence that counseling does, in fact, mitigate credit risk. Borrowers who
receive prepurchase homeownership counseling under the [program studied] are, on
average, 19 percent less likely to become ninety-day delinquent on their mortgages than
borrowers with equivalent observable characteristics who do not receive counseling....
All things equal, the ninety-day delinquency rate of borrowers who received individual
counseling was reduced by 34 percent ... ); Valentina Hartarska & Claudio Gonzalez-
Vega, Evidence on the Effect of Credit Counseling on Mortgage Loan Default by Low-
Income Households, 15 J. HOusING ECoN. 63, 63 (2006) ("We find some evidence that
counseled borrowers defaulted less often than non-counseled borrowers ... ); Valentina
Hartarska et al., supra. note 13, at iii ("Our findings indicate that cash flow-based
counseling can decrease the incidence of default. Counseled borrowers exhibit one-half
the hazard rate of default of non-counseled borrowers. The positive impact of counseling
most likely emerges from the more accurate measurement of repayment capacity that
results from the counseling process and from the abandonment of rigid income-to-debt
ratios in screening potential borrowers."); see also Roberto G. Quercia et al., The Cost-
Effectiveness of Community-Based Foreclosure Prevention 35 (Dec. 8, 2005)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.thfand.orgldndreports/MFP_-Full-
Report.pdf (borrowers who received pre-purchase counseling are more likely to avoid
foreclosure).
222 The program was instituted under the authority of 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 77/70
et seq. (West 2010), and is commonly known as H.B. 4050.
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lowest-credit-quality borrowers to avoid the more 'exotic' mortgage
products: adjustable rate and interest only.223
Another review found the counseling "helped borrowers better
understand the costs and terms of their loans, leading to better-informed
decision-making." 224 Tellingly, the same review found that "[m]ore than half
of the borrowers referred for [counseling] could not afford the loan they were
being given by their mortgage broker/loan originator" 225 while 38% of the
borrowers had been given loans with debt-to-income ratios exceeding half
their income.226
It thus appears that credit counseling offers hope of reducing defaults and
reducing the use of onerous terms.227 Credit counselors can also counter the
223 Sumit Agarwal et al., Can Mandated Financial Counseling Improve Mortgage
Decision-Making? Evidence from a Natural Experiment 3-4 (Feb. 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), available at
http://management.ucsd.edu/faculty/seminars/2009/papers/david.pdf. The authors also
concluded "that mandatory counseling limited both the demand for new mortgages and
the supply of credit, and hampered real-estate market activity in the treated areas." Id at
3.
224 ILL. DEP'T FIN. AND PROW'L REGULATION, supra note 10, at 1.
225 Id. The definition of "unaffordable" was a ratio of debt to income of more than
45%. Id. at 2. In contrast, the Department of Housing and Urban Development standard is
30%. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
226 ILL. DEP'T FIN. AND PROF'L REGULATION, supra note 10, at 3. In only 12% of the
cases were no issues found with the loan. Id. "'No Issues' meant that the information
entered by the Loan Originator matched the information verified by the HUD-certified
Counseling Agency; there were no indicia of fraud; that the borrower appeared to
understand the transaction; that the loan had a 'market rate'; and that it was 'affordable."'
Id. The agencies also found that 22% of the loan rates exceeded the market rate, which
the agencies defined as exceeding 9.186% when fixed rates were no more than 6.4%. Id
227 See Stark & Choplin, supra note 165, at 85 (calling for counseling in some
circumstances). But counselors may not be a perfect solution. See U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-606, REVERSE MORTGAGES: PRODUCT COMPLEXITY
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ISSUES UNDERSCORE NEED FOR IMPROVED CONTROLS OVER
COUNSELING FOR BORROWERS 2 (2009) ("GAO's undercover participation in 15..
counseling sessions found that while the counselors generally conveyed accurate and
useful information, none of the counselors covered all of the topics required by HUD
.GAO: CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 107, at 95 ("[Cjounseling may be
ineffective against lenders and brokers that engage in fraudulent practices, such as
falsifyii~g applications or loan documents, that cannot be detected during a prepurchase
review of mortgage loan documents. Finally, the quality of mortgage counseling can vary
because of a number of factors. For example, one federal official cited an instance of a
mortgage company conducting only cursory telephone counseling in order to comply
with mandatory counseling requirements."). Accordingly, at a minimum, it would be
necessary to have rigorous training and oversight for counselors.
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claims of predatory lenders, and draw consumers' attention to matters lenders
like First Alliance might prefer they overlook.228 But credit counselors cost
money, and it seems pointless to require those who don't need a credit
counselor to spend that money. Consequently, some measure should be taken
to distinguish those who need a counselor from those who can understand the
disclosures without one. Regulators should take a page from college
placement exams and require borrowers who wish to avoid retaining a credit
counselor to demonstrate understanding of their loan terms and budget by
requiring them to take a test: those who pass can dispense with a credit
counselor, though of course they would always be free to retain one, while
those who fail should not be permitted to borrow until a credit counselor
certifies that -they understand the loan terms and the consequences those
terms will have for them. The "placement test" should include questions
drawn from the video-to insure that the borrower understands the
consequences of poor decision making-the specific loan terms the borrower
is contemplating assuming, and the effect those terms may have on the
borrower's budget-to insure that the borrower fully appreciates the
significance of her decision.
At the end of the day, however, disclosure is not a complete remedy.
Some terms may be too complex to be conveyed to ordinary consumers.
Consumers may simply refuse to believe others. 229 Accordingly, as Federal
Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bemnanke has noted, "In those cases, direct
regulation, including the prohibition of certain practices, may be the only
way to provide appropriate protections." 230
228 See Willis, supra note 220, at 269 ("Affordable expert advice provided through a
publicly funded, accessible system of neutral, financially trained intermediaries, akin to
pro bono legal advice, could equalize the positions of consumers and sellers and reduce
consumer anxiety about financial decisions.").
229 See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
230 Ben S. Bemranke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Address at the Federal Reserve
System's Biennial Community Affairs Research Conference (Apr. 17, 2009), transcript
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bemnanke200904l 7a.htm;
see also Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,524 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 226) ("Limitations on price and product transparency in the subprime market-
often compounded by misleading or inaccurate advertising-may make it harder for
consumers to protect themselves from abusive or unaffordable loans, even with the best
disclosures."); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 47, at 68 ("Notices can be made better and
consumers more knowledgeable through education and counseling. Those alone will not
amply protect consumers.").
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C. The Paternalism Argument
These measures are unquestionably paternalistic. They will bar some
consumers from borrowing at the moment when they wish to, though the
borrowers may later be able to obtain a loan. They require borrowers to
satisfy additional requirements, such as taking a test and viewing a video, in
what is already a time-consuming and tiresome process.231 Borrowers who
already fully understand the risks of borrowing and understand their loan
terms will be required to demonstrate that fact, thereby incurring costs and
delays that do not benefit them. Not only do such delays postpone borrowers'
ability to move into a new home, they may also increase the cost of locking
in interest rates.232 How can this be justified in a private transaction, such as
that between lender and borrower?
The answer is that the transaction is not truly private. Society has a stake
in avoiding foreclosures. The subprime crisis precipitated the worst
economic decline since the Great Depression, one that some claim is itself a
lesser depression,233 and has earned the sobriquet "the Great Recession."
According to the Center for Responsible Lending, subprime foreclosures in
2009 alone will cause more than 69.5 million nearby homes to decline in
price an average of $7,200, producing a $502 billion drop in property
values.234 Dan Jmmergluck and Geoff Smith cataloged some of the costs
231 Opinions differ as to whether the Chicago mandatory counseling program caused
delays. Compare ILL. DEP'T FIN. AND PROF'L REGULATION, supra note 10, at 2 ("There
were no documented delays in the closing of loans because of a lack of counselors or
delays in providing the [counseling]. From this perspective, HB 4050 had no adverse
effect on either the mortgage lending or real estate sales processes."), with Lisa K. Bates
& Shannon Van Zandt, Illinois' New Approach to Regulating Predatory Lending:
Unintended Consequences of Borrower Triggers and Spatial Targeting 23 (Univ. of 1ll.
Spatial Pol'y Analysis Research Consortium, Working Paper No. 2007-02, 2007),
available at http://www.ace.illinois.edu/Reap/SPARC/2007-02_-BatesVanzandt.pdf
("While the [counseling] process is intended to take less than two weeks, the borrowers'
interest rate lock period may pass 30 days due to difficulty in scheduling.
232 See Bates & Van Zandt, supra note 23 1, at 23.
233 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALSIM: THE CRISIS OF '08
AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION, at vii-ix (2009).
234 SOARING SPILLOVER, supra note 7, at 1; see also Neighborhoods. The Blameless
Victims of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic
Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, I110th Cong. 34-35, 41
(2008) (testimony of Vicki Been, Elihu Root Professor of Law, New York University)
(also finding that foreclosures reduce value of nearby properties, though less so than the
Center for Responsible Lending study, and noting, "Our research shows that the
foreclosure crisis is affecting not just the homeowners who are unable to pay their
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foreclosures impose on communities: "Foreclosures, particularly in lower-
income neighborhoods, can lead to vacant, boarded-up, or abandoned
properties. These properties, in turn, contribute to physical disorder in a
community, create a haven for criminal activity, discourage the formation of
social capital, and lead to further disinvestment. 235 And William C. Apgar
and Mark Duda explained: "Foreclosures are not only expensive to
borrowers and lenders, but [in Chicago] they involve more than a dozen
agencies and twice as many specific municipal activities, and generate direct
municipal costs that in some cases exceed $30,000 per property." 236 The lost
mortgages, but also is imposing significant costs upon the neighbors and tenants of those
owners, as well as the communities in which the properties going into foreclosure lie.").
235 Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The External Costs of Foreclosure: The Impact
of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values, 17 HOUSING POL'Y
DEBATE 57, 57 (2006) ("Our most conservative estimates indicate that each conventional
foreclosure within an eighth of a mile of a single-family home results in a decline of
0.9% in value."); see also Dan Immergiuck & Geoff Smith, The Impact of Single-Family
Mortgage Foreclosures on Neighborhood Crime, 21 HOUSING STUD. 851, 863 (2006)
("This study finds that higher neighborhood foreclosure rates lead to higher levels of
violent crime at appreciable levels."); EsSENE & APGAR, supra note 68, at 2
("[Floreclosed properties can remain vacant for a prolonged period of time, depressing
property values and contributing to neighborhood instability and stigma.").
236 WILLIAM C. APGAR & MARK DUDA, HOMEOWNERSHIP PRESERVATION FOUND.,
COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE MUNICIPAL IMPACT OF TODAY'S MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
Boom 4 (2005), available at
http://www.995hope.org/content/pdf/Apgar-Duda..Study_ShortVersion.pdf. The
authors expounded:
For municipalities, foreclosures trigger significant direct expenditures for
increased policing and fire suppression, demolition contracts, building inspections,
legal fees, and expenses associated with managing the foreclosure process (e.g.,
recordkeepinglupdating). Police officials interviewed for this study also cited the
damage to quality of life from empty, foreclosed properties, including gang activity,
drug dealing, prostitution, arson, rape, and murder. Even after the foreclosure
process is completed, costs continue to accrue in cases where the municipality
inherits responsibility for securing and/or demolishing the unit, clearing trash from
the lot, and keeping weeds under control.
When foreclosure leads to demolition, the municipality faces additional
property tax losses because it must remove the assessed value of the structure from
its tax roles [sic]. Municipal revenues are also reduced by delayed and uncollected
taxes and unpaid service fees for water, gas, and electricity. More generally, to the
extent that foreclosures make urban neighborhoods less attractive to households and
businesses, municipal sales and income tax receipts also suffer.
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jobs, lost wealth, shuttered businesses, damaged communities, and general
decline in societal well-being means that society has an interest in preventing
repetitions of the behavior that led to the economic slide. In recognition of
that interest, Congress has enacted a series of statutes designed either to
ameliorate the severity of the slump or prevent its repetition.237 In that light,
paternalistic legislation seems justified.
In addition, most of the suggested interventions are only marginally
paternalistic; indeed, they constitute examples of what Thaler and Sunstein
call "libertarian patemalism"-an intervention that does not bar the
consumer from pursuing his desired action but helps the consumer make a
better decision. 238 Alternatively, the interventions could be justified as
"4asymmetric paternialism," which has been defined as an approach that
"6creates large benefits for those who make errors, while imposing little or no
harm on those who are fully rational." 239 Thus, those who can pass the test
can avoid much delay and expense, while those who cannot would derive
large benefits from taking the test.
Critics of the Chicago counseling program complained that it was
racist.2 40 But that seems to have more to do with the fact that the program, a
pilot program, was confined to area codes that were disproportionately
populated by people of color.241 A program that was not so confined should
not be subject to such concerns.
Complicating matters is the fact that nonprime foreclosures tend to cluster in
ways that generate significant spillover effects as vacant properties become magnets
for crime and other social ills. In fact, extreme rates of loan failure suggest that
foreclosures are "contagious," with one loan failure increasing the likelihood of
another.
Id at 6, 7, 9.
237 See, e.g., Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289,
122 Stat. 2654 (2008) (codified as amended at scattered titles and sections of the United
States Code).
238 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 4-6. Some of the measures suggested
in this paper, like banning contract terms that consumers cannot understand or barring
borrowers from taking out loans if they do not understand the terms, however, go beyond
libertarian paternalism.
239 Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and
the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1212 (2003).
240 See Agarwal et al., supra note 223, at 7 (footnote omitted).
241 See id
834 Vol. 71:4
2010] PREVENTING ECONOMIC CRISES83
D. Cost
The measures suggested above will increase the cost of borrowing and
slow it down.2 42 This subsection argues that those costs are worth incurring.
The video may be costly to create, but once it is created, the marginal
cost of showing it to additional borrowers is trivial. When the cost of the
video is amortized over millions of loan applicants, it seems likely to add
only an insignificant amount to each individual loan.
Perhaps the most costly suggested intervention, in terms of out-of-pocket
costs, is the credit counseling. The Chicago ordinance mandated a $300
charge, which was to be paid by the mortgage originator.243 Those receiving
counseling must invest time, disclose their financial circumstances, and, if
they later litigate against the lender for, say, unconscionability, may
encounter greater difficulty in claiming that they did not understand their
loan terms. 244 But probably many borrowers will be able to "place out" of the
credit counseling. In addition, Congress does not seem to find the cost of
credit counseling too daunting, because it has already required credit
counseling in other contexts. Thus, consumers filing for bankruptcy, even if
represented by attorneys, must demonstrate that they have received
242 Cf Zywicki & Adamson, supra note 2, at 4 ("Heightened protections for
borrowers that increase the cost or risk of lending will raise the cost of lending and result
in either higher interest rates for borrowers or reduced access to credit."). The Chicago
program led to differing views about the effect of mandatory counseling on access to
credit. Compare ILL. DEP'T FIN. AND PROF'L REGULATION, supra note 10, at 1
("Counseling agencies did not find that HB 4050 limited borrowers' access to credit
within the Pilot Program Area or that the Pilot Program Area was considered unattractive
to new homebuyers. More than 300 different Illinois mortgage licensees originated loans
for borrowers in the Pilot Program Area during the Pilot Phase."), with Bates & Van
Zandt, supra note 231, at 5 ("Several lenders suspended lending in the targeted areas,
citing concerns about liability.").
243 See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 77/70(d) (West 2010); Agarwal et al., supra note
223, at 6. Another study reported what it described as "very approximate information on
the average costs of providing housing counseling services." CHRISTOPHER E. HERBERT
ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF Housu~G AND URBAN DEv., OFFICE OF POL'Y DEV. AND RESEARCH,
THE STATE OF THE HOUSING COUNSELING INDUSTRY Xii (2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-- 1341050. The authors further reported:
About half of all agencies have average costs per client of around $200 or less,
another third have average costs between $200 and $500, and about one-fifth
have average costs of more than $500. However, 10 percent of agencies have
average costs of more than $1,000 per client, resulting in a high average across
all agencies ($43 1) compared to the median ($225).
Id
244 Agarwal et al., supra note 223, at 6.
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counseling.245 Before emerging from bankruptcy, debtors must undergo still
more counseling, in the hope that they will learn to avoid the behavior that
caused them financial difficulties.246 If the cost of counseling is worth
imposing not just once, but twice, on those who have the least resources, it is
surely worth requiring for those whose financial circumstances are strong
enough for them to obtain credit and who risk failures that might impose
significant costs on society, not to mention themselves. Nor is required
counseling limited to bankruptcy. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac require
homeownership education, with a financial focus, for some of their
affordable mortgage programs.247 Some state anti-predatory lending statutes
require credit counseling.248 And applicants for reverse mortgages must get
counseling.249
Even if the cost is significant-and it probably will not be-that cost
pales in comparison to the cost the subprime fiasco has imposed on
society.250 The cost of ex ante comprehension is also likely to be less than
the cost of ex post litigation that might stem from some alternative
suggestions for addressing the problem, such as imposition of a fiduciary
duty on mortgage originators or a requirement that lenders offer only loans
suitable for the particular borrower. 25'
If the program is successful, it is likely to reduce the number of
consumers who take out loans. That in turn may reduce the demand for
245 See I11 U.S.C. § 109(h) (2006).
246 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(1 1), 1328(g)(1) (2006).
247 See, e.g., FANNIE MAE, Home-Buyer Education Policies,
https://www.efanniemae.com/is/hcounselors/homebuyered.j sp (last visited Aug. 23,
2010); FREDDIE MAC, Home Possible Mortgages Homeowners hip Education
Requirements,
http ://www.freddiemac.com/sell/factsheets/pdf/home..possible-education-requirements_
748.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 20 10).
248 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1. 1 E(c)(l) (2010).
249 See 24 C.F.R. § 206.41(a) (2010).
250 Robert J. Shiller, How About a Stimulus for Financial Advice?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
18, 2009, at B5, argues for "starting a major program to subsidize personal financial
advice for everyone." See also Willis, supra note 220, at 269 ("Affordable expert advice
[could be] provided through a publicly funded, accessible system of neutral, financially
trained intermediaries .. . ." (footnotes omitted)).
251 See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 39, at 98 ("The regulation of consumer credit
markets is not amenable to ex post judicial review."). For proposals for imposition of a
suitability standard, see, e.g., Engel & McCoy, supra note 72, at 1318; Daniel S.
Enbrenberg, If the Loan Doesn't Fit, Don't Take It: Applying the Suitability Doctrine to
the Mortgage Industry to Eliminate Predatory Lending, 10 J. AFFORDABLE Hous. &
CmTY. DEV. L. 117, 125-26 (2001); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 47, at 68. 1 have no serious
quarrel with such suggestions, however.
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purchasing homes, with numerous consequences for the economy. Some
reports suggest that the Chicago pilot project reduced home sales.252 But the
events of 2008-09 suggest that that is no cost at all. If consumers would not
want loans if they were better informed, they should be given the tools to
discover that fact. Society would be far better off today if more of the
consumers who ended up in foreclosure had made such a judgment. Even the
purported benefit of lending to subprime borrowers-increasing
homeownership and creating an "ownership society"--has been a chimera.
According to the Center for Responsible Lending, subprime lending has
actually produced a drop in homeownership in light of the mountain of
foreclosures.253 Similarly, while lenders may make fewer loans under the
reforms suggested in this Article, that seems better than having them make
the kinds of loans they made that triggered the economic crisis: loans that
ended up in foreclosure, and forced many lenders into bankruptcy.254
An arguable cost of the approach suggested herein is that it would
discourage lenders from using incomprehensible terms that benefit
borrowers. It is not clear, however, that terms that are both incomprehensible
and beneficial to consumers exist. Barring the use of unintelligible terms
might also raise the cost to lenders of developing new loan products, because
any such products that increase term complexity might be more difficult to
explain to consumers. But the loss of such products might not actually be a
problem. In hindsight, the complexity of subprime loans was one of their
drawbacks. Complexity has significant costs, including impairing
comparison shopping, because complex loans are less easily compared to
252 Bates & Van Zandt, supra note 231 at 5-6 ("[A] preliminary analysis of sales
data [shows] that borrower-triggered interventions are having a dramatic negative effect
on housing sales ... ); Lesley R. Chinn, Critics: HB 4050 is an Invasion of Privacy,
CHI. WEEKEND, Nov. 8, 2006, available at ProQuest (realtor attributed 80% decline in
sales to HB 4050).
253 CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, SURPRIME LENDING: A NET DRAIN ON
HOMEOwNERSHIP 2 (2007). available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-
lendinglresearch-analysis/Net-Drain-in-Home-Ownership.pdf ("Subprime loans made
during 1998-2006 have led or will lead to a net loss of homeownership for almost one
million families. In fact, a net homeownership loss occurs in subprime loans made in
every one of the past nine years." (footnote omitted)); see also DiLorenzo, supra note 20,
at 53 ("[T~he evidence has actually revealed that there were no net societal benefits in the
form of increased levels of homeownership in the long-term.").
254 Cf Camerer et al., supra note 239, at 1220-21 ("[W]e claim that any
asymmetrically paternalistic policy that helps boundedly rational consumers make better
choices must, on net, increase economic efficiency as measured by the sum of consumer
and producer surplus... . To the extent that [asymmetric paternalistic] policies succeed,
they will result in superior social outcomes even if individual firms are hurt. However, it
is not necessarily the case that firms will be hurt. .. )
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other loans, and it may be that any term that consumers cannot understand
simply comes at too dear a price. And complexity need not mean
incomprehensibility: if all the parties to a loan wish borrowers to understand
particular loan terms, surely a way can be found to achieve that goal.
E. The First Assumption
This Article noted at the o utset that it is based on an assumption that
consumers will not knowingly assume obligations that they cannot discharge,
and therefore better consumer protections of the sort suggested in this Article
could have prevented the economic crisis. Some have challenged that
assumption. 255 The assumption is probably accurate as to some consumers
but not as to others, but in truth, the assumption remains largely untested.
The assumption finds some support in evidence that borrowers are more
likely to spurn higher-priced loans.256 )While it is impossible to know
precisely what it is about the loans that prompts higher rejection rates,
perhaps among the factors is that borrowers find them more likely to
generate defaults.
If circumstances had been different, the subprime crisis might have
presented one test of the assumption: perhaps informed borrowers would
have been willing to take on loans which they would find unaffordable at
some point in the future if they were confident in their ability to refinance.
Some consumers seemingly were persuaded to take out mortgages by claims
that they would be able to refinance before the loans adjusted to a higher rate.
The theory was that real estate prices would rise, thereby giving borrowers
increased equity in their homes. They could then refinance at a lower rate
because the increased equity would reduce the lender's risk. Lenders found
the prospect of short-term refinancing attractive because it enabled them to
obtain additional fees within a fairly short period, especially for loans that
provided for prepayment penalties.
But it is not clear that this is what happened. Considerable evidence
suggests that borrowers did not understand their loan obligations257 and so
255 See FTC Workshop, supra note 44, at 147-48 (statement of Paul Willen, Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston) ("[M]ore or better disclosures about the mortgage itself would
not have helped that much because it is not the mortgages that are the problem, it is the
house prices.... In terms of households making the right decision they needed not just
an understanding of the mortgage itself, but a broader understanding of the risks of home
ownership including house prices and, in particular, house prices.").
256 See WOODWARD, STUDY OF CLOSING COSTS, supra note 75, at 77 (reporting that
lenders make higher-priced offers in neighborhoods with fewer adults with college
education, and that lenders experience higher rejection rates in such neighborhoods).
257 See supra Sections H.A-IL.F.
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had no reason to consider the possibility that their loans would become
unaffordable and they would default on them. Indeed, even if home prices
had continued to rise and borrowers had accumulated equity, borrowers
might have found refinancing too costly because of the fees and prepayment
penalties involved-something many borrowers apparently failed to realize,
representing another TWLA failure.258
Lenders would have had little need to deceive borrowers about their
obligations-by, for example, presenting variable rate loans as fixed 259-if
borrowers would still have entered into those loans even if they had known
the truth. A thought experiment makes the point. Suppose lenders had said to
borrowers that the borrower would find the loan payments unaffordable
relatively soon after the purchase, at which time the borrower would
refinance, with the result that the borrower would have more affordable
payments until the next change date and the lender would earn additional
fees. If, however, for some reason, refinancing was impossible, the borrower
could expect to default and be foreclosed upon. Some borrowers probably
would have accepted that risk. But it is likely that many would not have.
They might instead have purchased less expensive homes to reduce their risk
or foregone buying altogether. The result would have been that the economic
crisis would not have occurred or would have been less severe. But because
it appears that many borrowers failed to appreciate the risk they were taking,
this exercise must remain a thought experiment.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article demonstrates that TWLA failed to convey to subprime
borrowers their payment obligations. First, it explores the disclosure forms
and argues that those forms contained misleading numbers for monthly
payments for adjustable-rate loan borrowers, making it difficult for
borrowers who read the forms to determine whether they could make their
payments. Second, the Article reports on a survey of mortgage brokers that
indicates that virtually no borrowers withdrew from loans when they saw the
final loan terms at the closing, and that many borrowers spent no more than a
minute reviewing the Truth in Lending disclosures. It thus appears that
consumer protection laws did not give borrowers what they needed to
258 The FTC Study found that a significant number of borrowers did not realize that
refinancing would trigger a prepayment penalty. LAcKO & PAPPALARDO, supra note 47,
at 36; see also supra note 133 for a discussion in the Jacobson and Paschal Affidavits of
deceptive tactics used by Wells Fargo loan officers to mislead borrowers as to the nature
of prepayment penalties.
259 See supra notes 46, 125 and accompanying text.
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recognize that they were assuming loan obligations which they could not
satisfy.
The Article argues that society should switch from the regime mandated
by the Truth in Lending Act, in which government officials who do not
participate in the lending process oblige lenders to make disclosures that they
do not care about or may even wish to obscure, to borrowers, who may not
appreciate the significance of what they are being given, and so may
overlook the disclosures. Furthermore, the Article suggests that society adopt
a comprehension regime in which lenders must insure that borrowers
understand their loan terms. Alternatively, lending markets should function
better if lenders were required to disclose information about the percentage
of consumers that understand their loan terms, which might spur competition
to improve the intelligibility of loan terms, and even lead to the abandonment
of those that few consumers can comprehend.
Because that proposal is politically unfeasible, the Article next suggests
some measures to improve the functioning of the existing disclosure regime.
Specifically, the Article advocates adoption of "nudges," after the book of
the same name by Cass Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler. Among the nudges
suggested by the Article are a video to make more salient to loan applicants
the risk of default and foreclosure, and disclosures that would convey the
percentage of borrowers with particular loan terms who later defaulted. The
Article also urges that loan applicants take the equivalent of a "placement
test" on their loan terms; those whose answers revealed that they did not
understand their loan terms would not be permitted to borrow until a neutral
credit counselor certified that they understand their loan terms.
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FIGuRE 1: THE FEDERAL RESERVE'S MODEL FORM FOR THE EARLY
DiSCLosuRE OF ADJUSTABLE RATE MORTGAGES FOUND IN 12 C.F.R.
PART 226 App. H-4(C).
This disclosure describes the features of the adjustable-rate mortgage
(ARM) program you are considering. Information on other ARM programs is
available upon request.
How Your Interest Rate and Payment Are Determined
*Your interest rate will be based on [an index plus a margin] [a
formula].
- Your payment will be based on the interest rate, loan balance, and loan
term.
-[The interest rate will be based on (identification of index) plus our
margin. Ask for our current interest rate and margin.]
-[The interest rate will be based on (identification of formula). Ask us
for our current interest rate.]
-Information about the index [formula for rate adjustments] is
published [can be found] _._
-[The initial interest rate is not based on the (index) (formula) used to
make later adjustments. Ask us for the amount of current interest rate
discounts.]
How Your Interest Rate Can Change
* Your interest rate can change (frequency).
" [Your interest rate cannot increase or decrease more than__
percentage points at each adjustment.]
e Your interest rate cannot increase [or decrease] more than__
percentage points over the term of the loan.
How Your Payment Can Change
* Your payment can change (frequency) based on changes in the interest
rate.
" [Your payment cannot increase more than (amount or percentage) at
each adjustment.]
- You will be notified in writing _ days before the due date of a
payment at a new level. This notice will contain information about your
interest rates, payment amount, and loan balance.
- [You will be notified once each year during which interest rate
adjustments, but no payment adjustments, have been made to your loan. This
notice will contain information about your interest rates, payment amount,
and loan balance.]
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*[For example, on a $10,000 [term] loan with an initial interest rate of
___[(the rate shown in the interest rate column below for the year 19
__] [(in effect (month) (year)], the maximum amount that the interest rate
can rise under this program is _ percentage points, to __%, and the
monthly payment can rise from a first-year payment of $__ to a maximum
of $_ in the ___year. To see what your payments would be, divide
your mortgage amount by $10,000; then multiply the monthly payment by
that amount. (For example, the monthly payment for a mortgage amount of
$60,000 would be: $60,000 + $10,000 = 6; 6 x =$__ per month.)]
[Example
The example below shows how your payments would have changed
under this ARM program based on actual changes in the index from 1982 to
1996. This does not necessarily indicate how your index will change in the
future.
The example is based on the following assumptions:
Amount.................................................................. $10,000
Term ...................................................................... .
Change date ...............................................................
Payment adjustment.................................................... (frequency)
Interest adjustment..................................................... (frequency)
[Margin]* ..................................................................
Caps __ [periodic interest rate cap]
___[lifetime interest rate cap
___[payment cap]
[Interest rate carryover]
[Negative amortization]
[Interest rate discount]"*
Index...(identification of index or formula)
*Thijs is a margin we have used recently, your margin may be different.
"*This is the amount of a discount we have provided recently; your loan
may be discounted by a different amount.]
842 Vol. 71:4
2010] PREVENTING ECONOMC CRISES 843
Margin Interest Monthly Remaining
Iex (Percentage Rate Payment Balance
Year %) points) M% M$ M$
1982 : To____ see _________ wha your ___ payments__ woul have een dring hatpriod
ivie your____ mortgage________ amun by_______ $10,000; ___ the multiply __themonthly
payment by_____ that __________ amont (For______ example,___ in 1996 th monthy paymet for
mortgage __ amount _________ of $60,000 ____ taken__ __ out in 1982 would be:Jj0,0j 1j,0 0=6 6x____ =$__________ per______ ]month.)___ I __________
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FIGURE 2: A SAMPLE TILA DISCLOSURE FORM FOR A 2/28 HYBRID
ADJUSTABLE LOAN
FEDERAL TRUTH-IN-LENDING DISCSURB SfATWEW
(T IS NETHER A (%)NTACT NCR A COMWMIr TO LEND)
Loa. Nmber Do: N1V0EMBER 7, 2006
Creditor:
Address:
Line containig an"x' a appbcable:
ANNUAL FINANCE Amount Ts.we O]TGsel
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